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I grant that good and evil, reward and punishment, are the only
motives to a rational creature: these are the spur and reins
whereby all mankind are set on work, and guided.
John Locke, Some thoughts concerning education (1693)
Introduction
This dissertation is composed of three chapters, each reporting an experi-
mental study conducted during my doctorate. These three studies seem to
be loosely connected at first glance, both in terms of content and of method.
The most basic connections between the three chapters of this work are the
general topic of “reciprocity” and the empirical approach of controlled ex-
perimentation. Indeed, the use of a wide variety of empirical methods is
probably the distinctive feature of this dissertation. I would like to convince
the reader that the logical connection between the three chapters is actually
deep and that a broad methodological approach is not only helpful but in
fact crucial for the understanding of human social behavior.
Chapter 1 describes how reputation concerns shape how much people
cooperate with each other. Second movers in a repeated trust game situation
with random matching behave much more cooperatively when their actions
are observed by future first movers. This alone is nothing new and has
been acknowledged by economists both theoretically (Kreps et al., 1982) and
empirically (Andreoni and Miller, 1993). The fundamentally novel aspect of
this experiment is the introduction of an additional treatment variable that
taps into the tool box of neuroscience. By manipulating neurophysiological
processes in our participants, we are able to provide causal evidence on the
biological mechanism that makes people willing to cooperate strategically and
why this behavior is characteristic for humans. As shown in experiment 1,
the processing of immediate concerns on the one hand and strategic concerns
on the other is anatomically differentiated in the brain. The prioritization
1
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of these concerns and their realization in behavior is crucially related to the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC).
While chapter 1 describes cooperative behavior that is largely motivated
by self-interested reasoning, it also hints at other motives because partici-
pants cooperate even in the absence of strategic incentives, another fact that
experimental economists have reported time and again.1 Some researchers
(Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006) report suggestive evidence
that even cooperation in anonymous interactions may also be the result of
(unconscious) reputation motives which are evoked by “implicit reputation
cues”. Chapter 2 describes a laboratory experiment where the implicit rep-
utation hypothesis for cooperation in the absence of strategic incentives is
directly tested, again in a trust game. Cues were implemented in guise of
stylized eye shapes on the background of the trustees’ computer screens. The
results suggest that implicit reputation motives are unlikely to drive coop-
erative behavior in anonymous interactions. In accord with chapter 1, this
experiment reaffirms that explicit reputation incentives dramatically increase
the amount of cooperation, although there is substantial reciprocity even in
the absence of strategic concerns.
Many economists are comfortable with the idea that people privately care
about fairness and reciprocity but insist that material incentives make them
behave self-interestedly, and that market forces ultimately eliminate those
people who do not comply with the rules of homo oeconomicus. They dis-
miss contradicting results from laboratory experiments because they assert
that—in contrast to economic interactions outside the laboratory—the in-
centives in the lab are too low-powered to offset fairness concerns, that the
laboratory setting is artificial, and that hence, results from lab studies are
not readily generalizable (Levitt and List, 2007). Although this partial view
is questionable, empirical researchers should strive for the widest array of
evidence available, including evidence from both laboratory experiments and
field experiments.
1See Fehr (2000) and Cooper and Kagel (2010) for reviews, and specifically Berg et al.
(1995) for the seminal paper on trust games.
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Chapter 3 of this dissertation therefore covers the economic relevance of
fairness concerns outside of the laboratory in the case of employment re-
lations. The empirical method of choice is the field experiment because it
accommodates the concern that behavior in the laboratory may be artificial
while retaining a maximum of control over the situational parameters. The
employer-employee setting creates a “real life” version of a principal-agent
social dilemma. Crucially, this study adds a further topical dimension to
the research on reciprocal behavior: social comparison. Do workers compare
themselves with others, and if so, does it influence their productivity? Exper-
iment 3 reveals that people not only care about how they are treated, they
also care about how they are treated relative to others. They reciprocate
unequal treatment more negatively than equal treatment. This result helps
explain important anomalies observed in empirical labor economics, namely
wage compression and wage secrecy, and corroborates the fairness-based be-
havioral theory of efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment (Akerlof
and Yellen, 1990).
Thus, the three experiments of this dissertation have a strong connection,
both from a substantive and a methodological point of view. All three studies
inquire into one particular behavior, namely second movers’ contributions
in a sequential social dilemma, as the natural measure of reciprocity. The
research that I present here follows a clear line of reasoning in the exploration
of human reciprocity and reaches from its evolutionary origins (“Why do
people reciprocate?”) and neurobiological causes (“What are the workings
behind it?”) to its relevance for economic research (“Why should economists
care?”).
Economists should care because many empirical phenomena can only
be understood if economists open the black box of human decision-making.
The guiding principles of human behavior, such as reciprocity, must be ex-
plored because they greatly influence economic outcomes. In a world where
economic interactions are characterized by incomplete contracts, reciprocity
plays a major role in keeping markets efficient. While concerns for reputa-
3
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tion in repeated interactions can resolve the issue of incompleteness through
strategic reciprocity (see experiment 1), concerns for fairness have the poten-
tial to make contracts “complete” even in anonymous one-shot interactions,
through strong reciprocity (see experiment 2). On the other hand, strong
concerns for fairness can also affect economic outcomes adversely, for exam-
ple, when firms refrain from cutting wages in fear of negative worker reactions
(see experiment 3). If actual wages remain above the market clearing wage,
involuntary unemployment is the consequence.
By now, the scientific exploration of decision-making has become more
powerful through the development of suitable empirical tools. It is one pur-
pose of this thesis to show how some of these tools—“canonical” behavioral
laboratory experimentation, neuroeconomic laboratory experimentation and
field experimentation—can be used as complements for this purpose.
The findings of experiment 1 and experiment 2 are published in Knoch
et al. (2009) and Fehr and Schneider (2009). The material presented in
the appendix has been translated into English, documents in the original
German versions as well as original z-Tree program files can be obtained
from the author upon request.
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Reputation is what you are in the light; character is what you are
in the dark.
Chinese proverb
Experiment 1
The Neurobiological Foundation
of Strategic Reciprocity
Summary Reputation formation pervades human social life. In this chap-
ter, we investigate the neural underpinnings of this important social mecha-
nism. We show that disruption of the right, but not the left, lateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC) with low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) diminishes subjects’ ability to build a favorable reputation. This
effect occurs even though subjects’ ability to behave altruistically remains
intact when reputation incentives are absent and even though they are still
able to recognize both the fairness standards mandating cooperation and
the importance of cooperation for building a good reputation. Thus, sub-
jects with a disrupted right lateral PFC no longer seem to be able to resist
the temptation to defect, even though they know that this has detrimental
effects on their future reputation. This suggests an important dissociation
between the knowledge about one’s own best interests and the ability to act
accordingly in social contexts. These results link findings on the neural un-
derpinnings of self-control and temptation with the study of human social
behavior, and they may help explain why reputation formation remains less
prominent in most other species with less developed prefrontal cortices.
5
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1.1 Introduction
Humans are unique in the extent to which social norms regulate their lives,
and reputation formation is a powerful mechanism in generating norm com-
pliance. Although much norm compliance is voluntary, there is ample evi-
dence that people are more likely to comply with norms when they feel ob-
served by others. In such a situation—“in the light”, as the Chinese proverb
puts it—individuals signal their quality as cooperators to future interaction
partners, thereby forming a good reputation.
Reputation formation is characterized by two features. First, the signals
for building a good reputation (in human societies) have to be costly, oth-
erwise they would be “cheap talk” and thus of no informational value for
the potential interaction partner. Second, this process of costly reputation
formation is characterized by a trade-off between the current benefits of de-
fection and the future benefits of cooperation through a good reputation.
Evidence for the crucial role of a good reputation in social decision mak-
ing comes from empirical studies showing that individuals increase their lev-
els of cooperation and are more likely to comply with norms when they
know that others observe their behavior, and that individuals cooperate
with those whom they observe cooperating with others (Nowak and Sig-
mund, 2005; Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Brown et al., 2004; Camerer
and Weigelt, 1988; Fehr et al., 2009; Basu et al., 2009; Houser et al., 2006;
Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk et al., 1999;
Cochard et al., 2004; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Seinen and Schram,
2006). Thus, the concern for reputation profoundly affects our daily social
interactions and motivates many important decisions in our lives.
Although reputation formation mechanisms are ubiquitous in social ex-
change, their neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Moreover,
a universal question arises, one with relevance not only to cognitive neuro-
science, but also to fields of research in evolutionary biology, developmental
6
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psychology, and behavioral economics: Which skills are required to acquire
a good reputation? Intuitively, we assume that there must be a self-control
capacity because forming a reputation typically requires an individual to
overcome the temptation to defect to gain future reputation benefits. From
a neurobiological perspective, we thus assume the involvement of the PFC
because this region has been shown to be involved in self-control processes
(Aron et al., 2004; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Knoch et al., 2006).
Four previous neuroimaging studies have examined reputation (Takahashi
et al., 2008; Delgado et al., 2005; Izuma et al., 2008; King-Casas et al., 2005).
Two of these studies did not address the neural underpinnings of the pro-
cess of individual reputation formation; i.e., they did not focus on the in-
dividual who forms a reputation. Instead, they examined individuals who
made decisions based on reputation information about another individual
(Takahashi et al., 2008; Delgado et al., 2005). In one of these studies, for
example, subjects played iterative trust games with three partners whose
(fictional) profiles make them seem morally good, bad, or neutral (Delgado
et al., 2005). The study reveals that information about the moral reputa-
tion of the interaction partner affected the investors’ reward prediction error
signal in the caudate nucleus during reciprocal exchange. Another study
showed activation of reward-related brain areas when a subject learned that
others perceived his or her reputation as good (Izuma et al., 2008). Finally,
one study used hyperscanning functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate two in-
dividuals interacting in an iterated trust game. The recorded brain activity
showed that the peak activation of the caudate nucleus underwent a tempo-
ral shift as the reputation of the interaction partner developed (King-Casas
et al., 2005).
No previous study provides causal evidence about the brain processes in-
volved in costly reputation formation, however. Functional imaging methods,
although indispensable, do not permit causal inferences about the effect of
brain processes on human behavior because the observed neural activations
could be spuriously correlated with task performance and need not necessar-
7
EXPERIMENT 1. NEUROBIOLOGY OF STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY
ily play a causal role in task execution (Walsh and Cowey, 2000; Sack and
Linden, 2003). In contrast, brain stimulation techniques, such as transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS), interfere non-invasively with the activity
of defined areas in the human cortex, allowing researchers to observe the
behavioral impact of an increase or decrease in the cortical excitability of
the stimulated brain region. Application of low-frequency repetitive TMS
(rTMS) for several minutes leads to suppression of activity in the stimulated
brain region that outlasts the duration of the exposition to rTMS by about
half the duration of the stimulation (Robertson et al., 2003; Eisenegger et al.,
2008). In this chapter, we investigate the effect of disrupting the PFC by
means of rTMS on subjects’ reputation formation.
1.2 Experiment
1.2.1 Experimental Procedure
We studied 87 right-handed men (mean age 22.6 years, ranging from 20 to
27 years). All provided written informed consent to participate in the study,
which was approved by the local Ethics Committee. None of the subjects
had been previously subjected to TMS or a trust game. No subject had a
history of psychiatric illness or neurologic disorder. There was no difference
among the 6 experimental groups with respect to age (χ2 = 8.478; df = 5;
p = 0.1318; Kruskal-Wallis test). None of the subjects experienced serious
adverse side effects or reported scalp pain, neck pain, or headache after the
experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007), recruitment was conducted using ORSEE
software (Greiner, 2004).
We implemented a fully-crossed 2×3 factorial design with the two factors
“information condition” and “stimulation condition” (see section 1.2.2). Sub-
jects took part in only one of the six possible factor combinations (between-
subjects design). Only trustees received stimulation. Because TMS could
8
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be applied to only one subject at a time, investors came collectively to the
laboratory of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (“investor
sessions”), while trustees were located at the University Hospital of Zürich
(“trustee sessions”). Implementation was such that investors and additional
trustees completed the experiment in the computer lab before the TMS ex-
periment. The subjects receiving stimulation then came individually to the
University Hospital Zürich for the trustee sessions. In each period, each of
these subjects was randomly matched with a subject from the investor ses-
sions so that their histories were matched; for example, a trustee who had
opted twice for “nothing” and once for “equalize” in the three previous periods
would be matched with an investor who had observed the same play in the
three previous periods in the investor session. The average net duration of
the experiment (from onset of the trust game to completion of control ques-
tions) was 401.5 s (maximum, 478.8 s). All participants were paid according
to their payoffs in the game; 1 point in the game equaled 0.20 Swiss francs
(CHF).1 In addition, participants in the lab received a show-up fee of CHF
10, and participants receiving stimulation received a show-up fee of CHF 60.
We implemented the experiment in this way to ensure that subjects had a
monetary incentive and a real concern about reputation.
1.2.2 Experimental Design
Trust Game
We chose a version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) as a vehicle for
investigating the effects of rTMS on costly reputation formation (see Fig-
ure 1.1 for a schematic representation). Subjects played 15 periods of this
trust game with randomly rematched partners each period. Each period was
divided into 2 stages, an investor decision stage and a trustee decision stage.2
In the first stage, the investor was endowed with 10 points and had to
decide the amount that he wished to invest in the current trustee. His choice
1CHF 0.20 = USD 0.18 at the time the experiment was conducted.
2Participant instructions are reproduced in appendix A.2.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the trust game. In each period,
two anonymous individuals—a first mover (investor) and a second mover
(trustee)—receive an endowment of 10 points each. The investor can in-
vest 1, 4, 7, or 10 points (e.g., investing 4 points means keeping 6 points).
The experimenter quadruples the invested points and transfers them to the
trustee, who then decides how many points he would like to transfer back
to the investor. The trustee has three options, independent of the invested
amount: he can transfer back nothing, a quarter of the received amount,
or an amount that equalizes the period payoff between the investor and the
trustee. Note that the game design is based on the design of experiment 2,
which was conducted prior to the experiment presented in this chapter.
was restricted to 1, 4, 7, or 10 points.3 Once the decision was made, the
invested amount was quadrupled and passed to the trustee; i.e., the received
amount was four times greater than the invested amount.4 In the second
3Zero investments were not allowed in order to exclude “costless” reputation formation.
Also note that no exact medium investment was allowed; i.e., investors were forced to
choose either a high or a low investment.
4After pretesting, we decided to quadruple the amount—instead of the usual tripling—
10
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stage, the trustee then had to decide how much of the quadrupled amount he
wanted to transfer back to the investor. This back transfer was not quadru-
pled.
The trustee’s choice was restricted to the following:
(a) Back-transfer nothing (= 0 percent of the received amount)
(b) Back-transfer 25 percent of the received amount (= the invested amount).
The investor finishes the period with his endowment of 10 points, al-
lowing him to “break even.”
(c) Transfer an amount that equalizes payoffs between the 2 subjects (=
62.5 percent of the received amount).
The restriction to three trustee choices also has the added advantage that
the reputation implications of different trustee behaviors are transparent.
For example, paying back nothing is unambiguously bad for the formation
of a good reputation, while equalizing payoffs is unambiguously good. The
payoff structure of this trust game is shown in Table 1.1.5
Table 1.1: Payoff matrix for investor and trustee. The investor plays rows
(investment of 1, 4, 7 or 10 points), the trustee plays columns (back transfer
is nothing, compensate or equalize). The first number in a cell is the investor
payoff, the second number the trustee payoff.
Trustee
Investor nothing compensate equalize
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25
to ensure sufficient 10-point investments in the anonymous condition, allowing for profound
statistical inference.
5Note that this structure is identical to the one in experiment 2.
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Information Conditions
We implemented two information conditions, which we term “anonymous
condition” and “reputation condition.” In the anonymous condition, the
trustee’s previous decisions are unknown to the current investor. In the
reputation condition, the investor has some information about the trustee
(see Figure 1.2). In particular, he can observe the trustee’s decisions in the
previous three periods (i.e., how many times the trustee chose to transfer
back “nothing,” “a quarter,” or “equalize payoffs”).6 Thus, the trustee knows
that the investor can condition his transfer on the trustee’s previous three
back transfer decisions. This also means that the trustee’s back transfer in
the current period affects the information that future investors receive about
him, i.e., it affects his reputation in future periods. A trustee is therefore
likely to acquire a bad reputation by transferring back “nothing,” whereas a
trustee improves his reputation by choosing to “equalize payoffs.” Because a
trustee who transfers nothing is unlikely to receive high transfers from the
investors in future periods, the trustees have an incentive to make high back
transfers in the reputation condition. Thus, this reputation incentive gener-
ates a motivational conflict for the trustees. A trustee could maximize his
short-run self-interest by choosing to transfer nothing back to the investor
in the current period, but this action is likely to have detrimental effects for
his reputation and decreases future investors’ willingness to transfer money
to him. Therefore, to reap the benefits from a good reputation in future
periods, a trustee must constrain his immediate self-interest and forgo the
current option of transferring back nothing.
In the reputation condition, each of the trustee’s decisions (given past
decisions) had exactly the same relevance for his reputation, thus keeping the
strategic incentive associated with the choice constant. This was achieved
by three design features: a stable information window of three periods, no
6Investors could only observe previous trustee choices, not back transfers. They had
no information about the size of the corresponding investments or the chronological order
of the choices.
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Figure 1.2: Trustee decision screen. On the top section of the screen, the
trustee can see his decisions in the three previous periods (not in chronological
order). In the reputation condition, the trustee also knows that the investor
is informed about the trustee’s previous three decisions before he makes a
transfer decision. The middle section of the screen contains information
about the current investor’s transfer and the resulting points at the trustee’s
disposal. The bottom section features three clickable buttons for the trustee’s
decision.
information on investment levels, and no information about the sequence of
choices. Moreover, these features helped keep the cognitive effort of the game
low. While the reputation benefit of a particular decision was kept constant,
note that the immediate benefit of the trustee’s choice was proportional to the
amount that the investor transferred (see Table 1.1). This made it possible
to observe different levels of “temptation.”
In contrast, the strategic incentive for behaving in a cooperative manner
is completely absent in the anonymous condition because the investors have
no information about the trustees’ past behavior. In terms of the Chinese
proverb cited at the beginning of this chapter, the trustees in the anonymous
13
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condition act in perfect darkness, and only their “character” plays a role.
Thus, the anonymous condition measures how much a trustee is willing to
return voluntarily to the investor (which may be viewed as a form of altruistic
behavior). This amount reflects the trustee’s preference for back transfers if
there are no strategic reputation incentives. If the trustee returns amount x
to the investor in the anonymous condition, then the trustee is apparently not
willing to return more than x. However, the trustee very well might return
more than x in the reputation condition, as strategic incentives for reputation
formation are then present; i.e., in his case the trustee must override his
immediate self-interest to build a good reputation.
Stimulation Conditions
We applied low-frequency rTMS for 15 min to 87 healthy subjects acting in
the role of the trustee.7 To investigate a possible hemispheric laterality in the
role of lateral PFC on trustee decisions, we applied rTMS to the right DLPFC
or to the left DLPFC. The creation of a stimulation group receiving rTMS
to the right DLPFC and a control group receiving rTMS to the left DLPFC
was important to control for the potential side effects of rTMS (Abler et al.,
2005), including discomfort, irritation, and mood changes. We implemented
an additional control condition in which we applied sham stimulation for 15
min to the right or left DLPFC. Thus, the factor “stimulation” had three con-
ditions: right DLPFC, left DLPFC, and sham. As described in section 1.2.2,
we implemented an anonymous condition and a reputation condition. Thus,
the experiment had a 2 × 3 design, with the factors “information” (anony-
mous, reputation) and “stimulation” (left rTMS, right rTMS, sham) leading
to six experimental groups. We randomly assigned each subject to one of the
six groups.
7See appendix A.1 for technical specifications.
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1.2.3 Questionnaire
Because disruption of the PFC also might affect subjects’ perception of what
constitutes the social norm in a certain situation, we further elicited indi-
viduals’ perception of fairness norms immediately after the trust game by
confronting them with a hypothetical scenario. We asked participants to
judge the fairness of a hypothetical trustee’s behavior on a 7-point scale
from “very unfair” to “very fair.” The scenario described an investor who
invests 7 points while the trustee returns nothing.
Disruption of the PFC also might affect subjects’ ability to assess the
consequences of a particular reputation, i.e., to assess the impact of actions
on future social interaction, which is an abstract and cognitively demanding
task. To rule out this explanation, we used another scenario to measure an
individual’s assessment of the potential consequences of a certain reputation.
We asked the subjects how many points (1, 4, 7, or 10) they would expect an
investor to transfer to a trustee who had chosen to “equalize payoffs” twice
and to transfer back nothing once.
Subjects also completed personality questionnaires that assessed impul-
sivity (Carver and White, 1994), using the BIS and BAS scales, and personal
norms of reciprocity (Perugini et al., 2003). These questionnaires were com-
pleted roughly 10 days after the experiment. Details regarding the question-
naire are provided in appendix A.3.
1.3 Hypotheses
How will disruption of the PFC with low-frequency rTMS affect the trustees’
behavior? Because the lateral PFC has been shown to be reliably involved in
overriding prepotent responses and self-control processes (Aron et al., 2004;
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Knoch et al., 2006), and because costly reputa-
tion formation requires overriding immediate benefits, disrupting this brain
region should functionally weaken self-control capacity and thus lead to a
15
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lower back transfer in the reputation condition compared with the other
stimulation groups. In contrast, little or no self-control effort is involved in
the anonymous condition because the trustee has no reputation incentive to
transfer back more than his immediate preference dictates. Therefore, we
would expect to see little difference between the stimulation groups for the
anonymous condition. Moreover, because the right lateral PFC in particu-
lar has been shown to be involved in control capacities (Aron et al., 2004;
Knoch et al., 2006), we hypothesized that disruption of the right, but not
the left, lateral PFC will lead to difficulty resisting the temptation to go for
the immediate benefit and thus reduce the ability to form a good reputation.
It is important to note that the trustee in the reputation condition knows
that the investor has information only about his three previous choices (i.e.,
“nothing,” “a quarter,” or “equalize payoffs”), not about how high the corre-
sponding investments were in the previous three periods. For example, if a
trustee receives an investment of 1 point and chooses “equalize payoffs” to
form a good reputation, then he actually transfers 2.5 points back. This is
because he received 4 points (1 point, quadrupled by the experimenter), and
transferring back 2.5 of those 4 points together with the initial endowment
of 10 points leaves both the investor and the trustee with equal amounts
totaling 11.5 points. If a trustee receives an investment of 10 points and
chooses “equalize payoffs,” then his back transfer is 25 points, and both play-
ers end up with a total of 25 points. Because future investors will observe
only the choice “equalize payoffs” but not the amount actually transferred by
the investor, the trustee’s reputation benefit is the same in both cases. The
immediate costs, however, are different: 2.5 points in the first case and 25
points in the second case.
Therefore, the costs of reputation formation (i.e., the number of points
the trustee must forgo to form a good reputation) vary with the size of
the investment, while the effect of a particular choice on a trustee’s repu-
tation is always the same, regardless of the received investment. In other
words, while the future reputation value of a trustee’s choice is independent
16
1.4. RESULTS
of investments, the immediate cost of reputation formation, and thus the
temptation to maximize one’s short-run self-interest, varies with the size of
the investment. Thus, the self-control effort necessary to constrain short-run
self-interest is likely to be much higher in cases of a large investment com-
pared with a small investment, where reputation formation is almost costless.
This variation in the temptation to maximize one’s short-run self-interest by
paying back nothing enables us to investigate whether the effect of disrupting
the lateral PFC depends on the degree of self-control required for reputation
formation. While the self-control hypothesis predicts a specific effect for high
investments, a global effect of rTMS on back transfers—irrelevant of the in-
vested amount—would not be consistent with this hypothesis. Rather, such
an effect would suggest other explanations, such as diminished ability to to
take into account the future consequences of one’s own decisions.
1.4 Results
Our results show that reputation formation paid off for the trustees in the
long run because investors gave more points to trustees who cooperated in
the past than to defectors. Trustees had a 71 percent probability of receiving
a 10-point investment if they always equalized payoffs, dropping below 6 per-
cent if they always chose to transfer back nothing. Consequently, a strategy
of cooperating in the first 14 periods and defecting in the last period (i.e.,
rational cooperation) was on average 43 percent more profitable (371 points)
than always defecting (260 points). Thus, the trustees had an incentive to
constrain their short-run self-interest and to transfer back a high amount in
the reputation condition because the investors conditioned their investments
on the trustee’s past actions. Accordingly, our results show that trustees
cared greatly about their reputation when reputation formation was possi-
ble. Subjects sent back on average 24.9 percent of the transferred amount
in the anonymous condition, compared with 43.8 percent in the reputation
condition (Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3: Effect of information condition on back transfers. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean (clustered over subjects), observations
are pooled over all stimulation conditions.
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Of primary interest are back transfers with regard to the investors’ high-
est investment because the temptation to follow short-run self-interest, and
thus the requirement for self-control effort, is greatest in this case. Focus-
ing on the reputation condition (Figure 1.4b), we see that the back transfer
for the highest investment was 41.2 percent following sham rTMS and 48.0
percent after real rTMS of the left DLPFC.8 These results contrast sharply
with the back transfer of 29.7 percent after rTMS of the right DLPFC. The
differences in back transfers across the stimulation groups are significant in
the reputation condition (p < 0.001 for the difference between right and left
DLPFC and p = 0.015 for the difference between right DLPFC and sham
condition). In contrast, we found no significant differences in back transfers
among the three stimulation groups in the anonymous condition (Figure 1.4a,
8This section reports the results of a generalized least squares (GLS) regression. For
details, see appendix A.4.
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p = 0.816 for the difference between right and left DLPFC and p = 0.232 for
the difference between right DLPFC and sham).
Figure 1.4: Trustee’s mean back transfer after an investment of 10 points,
across stimulation conditions. In the reputation condition, subjects whose
right DLPFC was disrupted transferred back significantly less points than
those in the other 2 stimulation groups (p < 0.02). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean, §clustered over subjects.
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In other words, while disruption of the right DLPFC significantly reduced
back transfers in the reputation condition in cases of highest investment, it
did not reduce back transfers in the anonymous condition. This indicates
a significant differential effect of rTMS across stimulations (right DLPFC
versus left DLPFC and sham) in the reputation condition, but not in the
anonymous condition.
Interestingly, those subjects in the reputation condition who received
rTMS to the right DLPFC transferred similar amounts back to the investor as
those in the anonymous condition (compare Figure 1.4a and 1.4b; p = 0.667;
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t-test). Thus, disrupting the right DLPFC completely removed the behav-
ioral impact of the reputation condition, but had no effect on behavior when
reputation formation was not possible. Moreover, there were no significant
differences across stimulation groups for lower investments, where the temp-
tation reap short-run gains and thus the recruitment of self-control effort was
lower (all p > 0.193).
rTMS of the right DLPFC limited subjects’ ability to override immediate
short-run benefits. However, rTMS changed neither subjects’ perception of
the fairness norm nor their ability to assess the consequences of past and cur-
rent trustee behaviors on future investments, which we elicited immediately
after the experiment (see appendix A.3). First, subjects in all three stimula-
tion groups judged the scenario of transferring back nothing in response to
an investment of 7 as rather unfair, and there were no differences in fairness
judgments across groups (p = 0.376; Kruskal-Wallis test). Second, rTMS of
the right DLPFC did not change subjects’ ability to assess the consequences
of past and current trustee behaviors because subjects in the different stimu-
lation groups predicted the same investments by future investors in response
to a given profile of past back transfers (p = 0.950; Kruskal-Wallis test).
Moreover, if rTMS of the right DLPFC had impaired subjects’ general abil-
ity to perform complex calculations, then we would have observed differences
across stimulation groups for the lower investments as well; however, our re-
sults show a behavioral effect only for the highest investments. This indicates
that disruption of the right DLPFC had an effect on the behavioral ability
to form a good reputation, even though it did not affect subjects’ ability to
perform complex cognitive operations, their recognition of the prevailing fair-
ness norm, or their ability to assess the future consequences of back transfer
behaviors.
We also investigated whether individual differences in impulsivity and
the propensity to reciprocate kind or hostile acts can explain our results.
We found that neither dispositional differences in subjects’ reciprocity norm
nor individual differences in impulsivity across treatment groups can explain
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the behavioral differences across conditions; there was no difference across
treatments for impulsivity or for the reciprocity norm.9
1.5 Conclusion
Our results indicate a highly specific, lateralized effect of a disrupted function
of the lateral PFC on the ability to form a reputation for being trustworthy.
We found no differences between the stimulation groups in the anonymous
condition, where the incentives for reputation formation are absent. In this
condition, only subjects’ preferences for altruistic behaviors can induce them
to repay trust, implying that an interference with the function of the right
lateral PFC leaves their altruistic propensities to behave in a trustworthy
manner unchanged. This contrasts with an rTMS effect in those circum-
stances in which costly reputation formation requires a particularly strong
recruitment of self-control effort, i.e., when the investors make a high in-
vestment. In this situation, the incentive to yield to the short-run costs for
building a reputation is greatest, suggesting an interpretation of the rTMS
effect in terms of the reduced ability to recruit the required self-control re-
sources. The absence of any rTMS effect on subjects’ ability to recognize
the prevailing fairness norm supports this conjecture. Thus, despite the fact
that subjects are well aware of the existing fairness norm, and even though
they have pecuniary incentives to obey this norm in the reputation condition,
they nevertheless do not act accordingly. This suggests that rTMS causes
a specific inability to constrain short-run temptations, rather than a cogni-
tive inability to perceive the normative demands involved in the situation.
The finding that rTMS had no effect on subjects’ ability to assess the future
consequences of past back transfers further supports our interpretation. Sub-
jects across all three stimulation conditions had the same knowledge about
the future benefits of high current back transfers, but only those subjects
9Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) scale: p = 0.827; Behavioral Approach System
(BAS) scale: p = 0.967; positive reciprocity scale: p = 0.741; negative reciprocity scale:
p = 0.971; Kruskal-Wallis tests.
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with transiently disrupted right DLPFC function were less able to constrain
their short-run self-interest and thus exploit this knowledge.
Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that right, but not
left, lateral PFC activity is a crucial factor in the ability to forgo immedi-
ate benefits to form a good reputation. Subjects whose right lateral PFC
was disrupted behaved as if they were not concerned about their reputation
when reputation formation required forgoing a large current benefit, sug-
gesting that they were less able to pay an immediate cost for future social
reputation benefits even though their ability to assess these benefits cogni-
tively remained intact. These findings suggest an important dissociation at
the neurobiological level between the knowledge about what is in one’s own
best interest in social interaction situations and the ability to act accordingly.
Moreover, by providing causal evidence on the role of the prefrontal cortex
in costly reputation formation, our findings also may help explain why rep-
utation mechanisms are rare in other species with less developed prefrontal
regions.
In highly complex processes such as reputation formation, brain areas do
not act in isolation, but rather must work together as a network. Future
studies could combine low-frequency rTMS and fMRI to explore how differ-
ent brain regions interact on the functional anatomical level in reputation
formation.
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Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration
and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with
them:
the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
Experiment 2
The Evolutionary Mechanism
behind Strong Reciprocity
Summary Strong reciprocity is characterized by the willingness to altru-
istically reward cooperative acts and to altruistically punish norm-violating,
defecting behavior. Recent evidence suggests that subtle reputation cues,
such as eyes staring at subjects during their choices, may enhance prosocial
behavior. Thus, in principle, strong reciprocity could also be affected by
eye cues. In this chapter, we investigate the impact of eye cues on trustees’
altruistic behavior in a trust game and find zero effect. Neither the subjects
who are classified as prosocial nor the subjects who are classified as selfish re-
spond to these cues. In sharp contrast to the irrelevance of subtle reputation
cues for strong reciprocity, we find a large effect of explicit, pecuniary repu-
tation incentives on the trustees’ cooperativeness. Trustees who can acquire
a good reputation that benefits them in future interactions honor trust much
more than trustees who cannot build a good reputation. These results cast
doubt on hypotheses suggesting that strong reciprocity is easily malleable by
implicit reputation cues not backed by explicit reputation incentives.
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2.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1, reputation incentives increase people’s propensity
to behave cooperatively. A large literature confirms that human coopera-
tion is positively affected by the possibility of acquiring a ‘good’ reputation
that may pay off in future interactions (Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Wedekind
and Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2001, 2002; Brown et al., 2004; Rege and
Telle, 2004; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Kurzban et al., 2007; Engelmann
and Fischbacher, 2009; Fehr et al., 2009). However, the fact that reputation
incentives improve prosocial behavior does not mean that people do not co-
operate in the absence of such incentives. In experiment 1, e.g., trustees
in the anonymous condition transferred back on average 25 percent of the
amount they received. These back transfers can be interpreted as altruistic.
Human altruism represents a huge outlier in the animal world (Boyd and
Richerson, 2005). Humans often behave altruistically towards genetically
unrelated strangers, even if the chance of meeting these strangers again is
extremely small and reputation concerns are unlikely to play a role (e.g.,
tipping an unknown taxi driver in a large foreign city). Altruistic behav-
ior in the absence of any opportunity of repeated interaction and reputation
formation has been repeatedly shown in tightly controlled economic exper-
iments (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003).
Experimental evidence (Fehr et al., 2002), social preference theories (Ra-
bin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004), and evolutionary theories (Gintis, 2000; Henrich and
Boyd, 2001; Boyd et al., 2003; Bowles and Gintis, 2004) also indicate that a
special type of altruistic behavior—strong reciprocity—plays a particularly
important role in establishing and sustaining cooperation among strangers.
Strong reciprocity is characterized by the willingness to altruistically reward
cooperative acts and to altruistically punish norm-violating, defecting behav-
ior. As a consequence, strong reciprocity generates important incentives for
cooperation among strangers.
Recent articles even seem to suggest that much of human altruistic be-
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havior may be related to reputation motives. They argue that cooperation
in anonymous one-shot interactions may be merely a response to subtle rep-
utation cues that are not in fact related to the possibility of benefiting in
future interactions from current altruistic acts (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bate-
son et al., 2006; Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007;
Rigdon et al., 2009). Haley and Fessler assert that reputation incentives
in the ancestral evolutionary environment thoroughly molded human social
interactions because “natural selection can be expected to have shaped hu-
man psychology to be exquisitely sensitive to cues that are (or were, under
ancestral conditions) informative with respect to the likely profitability of
co-operation in a given situation” (Haley and Fessler, 2005, p. 249). These
authors thus administered a visual cue—eyes staring at the subjects during
decision-making—in an anonymous experimental game, a cue “that, over the
course of human evolution, would have reliably indicated the potential ob-
servability of one’s behavior” (p. 249). Haley and Fessler (2005); Bateson
et al. (2006); Burnham and Hare (2007); Rigdon et al. (2009) indeed found
that eyes staring at the subjects cause an increase in prosocial behavior in
anonymous games such as the dictator game.
In this chapter we examine whether a reputation cue like that imple-
mented in Haley and Fessler (2005) also affects strong reciprocity, by con-
ducting an anonymous one-shot trust game in which a investor can send
money to a trustee; the experimenter then quadruples this amount, so that
the trustee receives four times the amount sent. The trustee observes how
much the investor has sent and can then send back as little or as much money
as he wants. Thus, the trustee can altruistically reward investors who have
sent money, which constitutes an instance of strong reciprocity. By compar-
ing the eye cue condition with a baseline condition without such cues we can
assess the impact of eye cues on strong reciprocity.
In addition to the eye cue condition we implement another reputation
condition in which subjects face a real pecuniary incentive for acquiring a
good reputation. Previous work has argued that eye cues activate reputa-
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tion concerns, but has not explicitly compared the effect of eye cues with
the effect of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. If humans are indeed
“exquisitely sensitive” to reputation cues even if they carry no real pecuniary
incentive power, eye cues should generate behavioral patterns that resemble
those generated by explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. Our design en-
ables us to draw this comparison and investigate the relative importance of
reputation cues for altruistic behavior.
We also go beyond previous work by examining which—if any—subjects
respond to the implicit reputation cue, because we measure subjects’ de-
gree of selfishness and opportunism with a Machiavellianism questionnaire
(Christie and Geis, 1970). Assessing individual differences in subjects’ re-
sponses to reputation cues is important because on average one might find
a null effect that hides important inter-individual differences. Implicit rep-
utation cues could increase the altruistic behavior of prosocial subjects, i.e.,
those who score low on the Machiavellianism (Mach) scale. This has impor-
tant consequences on the interpretation of altruistic behavior in anonymous
one-shot experiments. If prosocial subjects primarily respond to the implicit
reputation cue, it is possible to argue that they are mostly prone to all kinds
of other subtle reputation cues that are often not controlled for by the ex-
perimenter in the typical laboratory experiment (e.g., the mere presence of
other subjects and the experimenter in the room, or simply hearing human
voices). It would then be more plausible to attribute the baseline altruism
observed in anonymous one-shot experiments to such uncontrolled reputa-
tion cues. However, if prosocial subjects do not respond to the eye cues, it
is hard to argue along these lines. It is then implausible to attribute the
observed altruistic behavior to uncontrolled subtle reputation cues. Thus,
by measuring subjects’ Mach scores we can put important constraints on the
interpretation of altruistic behavior in anonymous one-shot experiments.
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2.2 Experiment
2.2.1 Experimental Procedure
We conducted the experiment at the laboratory of the Institute for Empir-
ical Research in Economics at the University of Zürich.1 Participants were
mostly students from the University of Zürich and the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zürich. After arrival at the laboratory, participants were
seated in separated compartments in front of computer terminals. Before the
experiment started, participants had to answer five control questions about
the experiment to make sure that they understood the instructions. The
experimenter left the room after having checked the answers of all partici-
pants.2
We measured strong reciprocity as second-mover behavior in a series of
one-shot trust games. A investor and a trustee interact with each other in
a trust game. The investor can send money to the trustee, which is then
multiplied by the experimenter so that the overall money available to the
two parties increases. The trustee can then send back none or some of the
money to the investor. Fairness norms typically demand that the trustee
sends back some of the money he received, but the trustee is completely free
to send back nothing if he likes. Details of the trust game are described in
subsection 2.2.2.
Our experimental design includes three treatments: a baseline treatment
where the trustee faces a neutral background screen (see Figure 2.1a); an
“implicit reputation” cue treatment where the background screen features
eyespot-like shapes (see Figure 2.1b), similar to those in Haley and Fessler
(2005)3; and an “explicit reputation” treatment where the current investor is
1The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fis-
chbacher, 2007), recruitment was conducted using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004).
2Translated versions of the instructions are reproduced in appendix B.
3We used the shape of Haley and Fessler’s eyespot cues and matched the neutral and
eyespot backgrounds for luminance and contrast. The background color was matched with
z-Tree’s default background color.
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Figure 2.1: Trustee decision screen.
(a) Baseline background.
(b) Eyespots background.
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informed of the trustee’s decisions in the previous periods (same background
screen as in the baseline treatment). Subjects were seated in separated com-
partments and were assigned either to the role of a investor or a trustee.
They maintained their roles throughout the experiment. They then played
10 periods of the trust game, with randomly rematched partners each period.
We conducted eight sessions—three sessions each in baseline and implicit,
two in explicit treatment—with 288 participants in total (144 investors and
144 trustees). The decisions in a group of subjects who interact with each
other over the 10 periods are statistically not independent. In order to estab-
lish statistically independent observations, we created three matching groups
per session, each consisting of 12 subjects. Only the subjects within a match-
ing group were matched with each other during the experiment, generating
three independent observations per session. With three matching groups per
session, we have nine independent observations both in the baseline treat-
ment and the implicit cues treatment, and six independent observations in
the explicit reputation treatment.
Immediately after the end of the last period, the participants had to
fill out a questionnaire containing items on emotional state, fairness atti-
tudes, Machiavellianism, trust, and socioeconomic data. After completion,
participants were paid a show-up fee of CHF 10 plus their earnings from
the experiment, at the rate of 1 point = CHF 0.2. In total, a session lasted
approximately 2 h and subjects earned on average CHF 48.88 (= USD 41.77).
2.2.2 Experimental Design
Each period of the experiment was a one-shot trust game. At the beginning
of each period investors and trustees were endowed with 10 points. The game
itself consisted of two stages: an investment stage, where investors had to
decide how many points they would transfer to their current trustee, and
a back transfer stage, where trustees had to decide how much they wanted
to transfer back to the investor. The amount investors sent was quadrupled
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and transferred to the trustee. Investors could choose between four possible
transfers: 1 point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points.4 Trustees had three op-
tions: they could transfer back either nothing, or the amount the investor sent
(henceforth “compensate”), or they could transfer back an amount that equal-
ized the period payoff between investor and trustee (henceforth “equalize”).
When the trustee determined the back transfer he was perfectly informed
about the investor’s choice and thus did not have to form beliefs about the
size of the investment.
We discretized the trustees’ strategy space because this made it much eas-
ier to inform the investors about the trustees’ past behavior in the explicit
reputation treatment. Because the trustees had only 3 choices—“nothing”,
“compensate” and “equalize”5—we could present the information about a
trustee’s past behavior by informing the current investor how often the
trustee had chosen each of these choice options in the preceding periods.
In addition, the choice options “nothing,” “compensate,” and “equalize” are
clearly distinct from each other, making it easier for the subjects to assess
their consequences in terms of reputation.
Table 2.1 shows the payoff matrix that corresponds to our trust game.
The first number in each cell of the matrix represents the investor’s payoff,
the second number denotes the trustee’s payoff. For any given investment
level, the trustee is always best off in terms of monetary payoff by transfer-
ring back nothing. This means that positive back transfers (i.e., the choices
“compensate” and “equalize”) can be regarded as altruistic acts because the
trustee gives up some of his own payoff to increase the investor’s payoff.6
Investors in the Explicit treatment could see a table with information
about the current trustee’s past behavior. This table contained the whole
history of choices, however, not in chronological order (see instructions in
4Note that all four choices are positive. We did not include a “zero investment” choice
because in this case a trustee could have built a reputation at no cost by choosing “equal
split” in response to a zero investment in the reputation treatment.
5These terms were not used in the instructions.
6The trust game is identical to the trust game in experiment 1. There, however,
investors had only information about the three most recent decisions of the current trustee.
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appendix B.1.2 for an example). Note that the actual amounts transferred
cannot be inferred from choices.
Table 2.1: Payoff matrix for investor and trustee. The investor plays rows
(investment of 1, 4, 7 or 10 points), the trustee plays columns (backtransfer
is nothing, compensate or equalize). The first number in a cell is the investor
payoff, the second number the trustee payoff.
Trustee
Investor nothing compensate equalize
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25
2.2.3 Questionnaire
As the response to the different treatments may be heterogeneous depending
on the subject’s degree of selfishness, we also measured each subject’s Mach
score. For this purpose we used the MACH-IV Machiavellianism Question-
naire (Christie and Geis, 1970), which provides a measure of selfishness and
opportunism. Recent results from a neuroeconomic study (Spitzer et al.,
2007) indicate that Machiavellian subjects are much less willing to share
money in a dictator game, and respond much more strongly to pecuniary
punishment threats for norm violations. Moreover, subjects’ Machiavellian-
ism also correlated strongly with activation in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex,
known to be reliably activated when subjects face punishing stimuli. Thus,
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence suggests that subjects’ Machi-
avellianism may affect their responses to our treatment conditions.
We also measured subjects’ fairness standards by asking them the follow-
ing question: “Suppose that participant A [i.e., the investor] transferred 10
points to participant B [i.e., the trustee]. B then chose ‘compensate’. How
31
EXPERIMENT 2. THE EVOLUTION OF STRONG RECIPROCITY
fairly do you judge this behavior?”7 Subjects indicated their answer to this
question on a Likert scale, coded from 1 (‘very unfair’) to 7 (‘very fair’). Note
that subjects with high fairness standards perceive the choice as unfair and
therefore assign a low score to this question, while subjects with low fairness
standards perceive the choice as fair and assign a high score. We wanted
the subjects to judge the action “compensate” because here the ambiguity
about the fairness of the action is greatest, thus maximizing the chances for
meaningful heterogeneity in subjects’ responses.
2.3 Hypotheses
The implicit cues treatment measures the impact of implicit reputation cues
on trustees’ altruistic behavior in the trust game. The explicit reputation
treatment enables us to assess the effect of explicit pecuniary reputation
incentives on trustees’ behavior. Thus, we can gain insight into the relative
importance of the two kinds of reputation effects by comparing the effect of
implicit cues with the effect of explicit reputation incentives.
Consider the baseline and the implicit reputation treatment condition
first. The game played in these two conditions constitutes a true one-shot
game because the players remain fully anonymous and they meet a different
anonymous partner in each period. Therefore, if both players are completely
selfish and want to maximize their money earnings, and the investor knows
this, the following outcome is predicted. The selfish trustee will always choose
“nothing” (i.e., his back transfer is zero), and the investor will invest the
lowest possible amount because he knows that the trustee will transfer back
nothing in any case.
However, there is a large literature indicating that a substantial share
of experimental subjects is not completely selfish (see Fehr and Fischbacher
(2003) for a review). This literature indicates that subjects may also have
social motives such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Dawes
7Additions in square brackets did not appear in the questionnaire.
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et al., 2007) or intention-based reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Inequity-averse trustees will
choose the “equalize” option, while trustees who interpret high investments
as particularly kind acts will make more generous back transfers in response
to high investments. We summarize both these behaviors under the term
“altruistic rewarding” because they imply a benefit for the investor at the
expense of the trustee and they reward the investor’s transfer.
A key question then is whether subjects’ social preferences are affected
by implicit reputation cues such as eye spots. Recent evidence (Haley and
Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007) suggests that
eye cues affect prosocial behavior in dictator games and public good games.
In view of this literature, one would expect the trustees to respond to the
eye spots in the implicit reputation treatment by making significantly higher
back transfers compared with the baseline treatment.
Because we are interested in the impact of the implicit reputation cue
on the trustees’ social preferences, it is important that the trustee chooses
his back transfer with the exact knowledge of how much the investor sent.
This feature of our design ensures that unknown beliefs about the investors’
transfers do not affect the trustees’ choices. In this respect, our design differs
substantially from the public goods experiments of Bateson et al. (2006) and
Burnham and Hare (2007), because it is not clear why subjects change their
contributions in response to a cue in a public goods experiment. In principle,
the cue could cause a more optimistic belief about the other players’ public
good contributions, which will then lead to an increase in the subject’s own
contribution; it is known that many subjects are conditional cooperators
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Croson, 2007; Kocher
et al., 2008), that is, they are willing to contribute more to the public good
if they believe that other group members contribute more. Alternatively,
the reputation cue could have a direct impact on subjects’ social preferences,
implying that subjects are willing to contribute more for any given belief
level. If the first hypothesis holds, the reputation cue does not affect subjects’
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social preferences; it only renders their beliefs about others more optimistic,
which then causes the change in behavior. If the second hypothesis holds,
the reputation cue has a direct effect on subjects’ social preferences. In our
experimental design a change in the trustees’ behavior cannot be attributed
to changes in their beliefs because the trustees know the exact investment
when they make their back transfer. Thus, we can measure the impact of the
implicit reputation cue for any given transfer level, which provides a clean
behavioral measure of a change in social preferences.
Because we measure subjects’ degree of Machiavellianism and their fair-
ness standards, we are able to examine whether subjects who score differently
on these measures respond differently in the different treatments. We expect,
in particular, that highly Machiavellian subjects tend to transfer back less
in the baseline condition. It is also important to examine the impact of
the implicit cue condition for subjects who score high and low on the Mach
score. In particular, if the non-selfish subjects (i.e., those scoring low on the
Mach score) are particularly responsive to the implicit reputation cue, one
may be more inclined to attribute the observed prosociality in anonymous
one-shot experiments to uncontrolled implicit reputation stimuli. Alterna-
tively, if eye cues trigger reputation concerns, opportunistic subjects (i.e.,
those scoring high in Machiavellianism) could be particularly responsive to
such cues. In contrast, if subjects’ Mach scores do not affect the response to
the implicit cue, one may have more confidence in the hypothesis that the
prosocial behavior in anonymous experiments is a true expression of subjects’
social preferences and not just an artefact of uncontrolled implicit reputation
cues.
In the explicit reputation treatment, the subjects’ personal identities are
still kept anonymous but we render the history of the trustees’ back trans-
fers observable for their current investors. Thus, each investor can assess the
past willingness of the current trustee to transfer back resources. Because
the trustees know this, even selfish trustees now have an incentive to choose
“compensate” or “equalize”, because in this way they can increase the likeli-
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hood that the investors they face in the future (and know their past choices)
will make large investments. This explicit reputation incentive ceases in the
final period (when there will be no future encounters with investors): the self-
ish trustees will defect in the last period, and only the trustees with social
preferences will make positive back transfers.
The effectiveness of the explicit reputation incentive requires that the
trustees understand that their current back transfers will affect average in-
vestments of future investors. Thus, the explicit reputation incentive will
only raise the trustees’ back transfers if the trustees exhibit this kind of ra-
tionality. Reputation incentives can also increase back transfers of subjects
with social preferences. They may, for example, choose “equalize” instead of
only “compensate” when the pecuniary incentive coincides with their social
motive. The hypothesis that explicit reputation incentives increase trustees’
transfers is also backed by previous findings (Gächter and Falk, 2002; Cochard
et al., 2004).
Our measure of Machiavellianism enables us to examine whether there
is a meaningful heterogeneity in trustees’ responses to the explicit reputa-
tion incentive. In view of the behavioral and neurophysiological evidence
documented in Spitzer et al. (2007), it seems plausible to conjecture that
highly Machiavellian subjects respond more strongly to the explicit reputa-
tion incentive. Future investors are likely to punish low back transfers by
lowering their investments. By definition, highly Machiavellian subjects are
particularly susceptible to such threats. Therefore, they should respond more
strongly to the pecuniary reputation incentives.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The Implicit Reputation Cue
In this section, we examine the impact of implicit reputation cues on trustees’
back transfers. If the implicit cue raises reputation concerns, the trustees in
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the implicit cue condition should make higher back transfers than those in
the baseline condition. Moreover, if the implicit cue has a sufficiently strong
effect, the back transfer pattern in the implicit cue condition should resemble
the pattern in the explicit reputation condition. Finally, if the implicit rep-
utation cue raises back transfers, this may also increase investments because
higher investments increase the investors’ payoffs if a sufficiently high share
of trustees choose to equalize payoffs (see the final column in Table 2.1).
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of average, median and modal choices
across treatments.
Treatment baseline implicit explicit
average back transfer 6.28 5.36 13.86
median trustee decision compensate nothing equalize
mode trustee decision nothing nothing equalize
average investment 5.88 5.74 7.73
median investment 7 7 10
mode investment 10 10 10
# subjects 108 108 72
# matching groups 9 9 6
Table 2.2 provides a first indication of the impact of the implicit cue
condition. In the baseline condition, the average back transfer is 6.28 points
and the trustees’ modal choice is ‘nothing’. The average back transfer in
the implicit cue condition is even somewhat lower and the modal choice
is also “nothing”. The small difference in the means across conditions is
not significant (p = 0.402, n = 18, Mann-Whitney U test). The investors’
transfer choices are also very similar across the two conditions. The median
investment level in both conditions is 7; investors in the baseline condition
invest an average of 5.88, while the average investment in the implicit cue
condition is 5.74 (p = 0.825, n = 18, Mann-Whitney U test).
Figure 2.2a shows the time path of average back transfers. The figure
indicates that the average back transfer varies between 5 and 8 units in both
the baseline condition and the implicit cue condition, with little difference
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Figure 2.2: Trustees’ mean back transfers.
(a) Over time across treatment conditions; error bars represent stan-
dard errors on matching group level (n = 24).
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(b) Per investment level across treatment conditions.
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between the conditions. The figure also displays the standard errors (clus-
tered on matching groups) of the mean, which indicate that the differences
between baseline and implicit cue conditions are not significant (p ≥ 0.272,
Mann-Whitney U tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple com-
parisons). Thus, Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2a provide little indication that the
implicit cue condition increased average back transfers.
An examination of the impact of implicit cues in more detail requires
further control for the investments that the trustees face. Figure 2.2b shows
the trustees’ average back transfer conditional on the received investments.
On average, trustees in the implicit cues condition sent back the same or
a slightly smaller amount than in the baseline condition for any given in-
vestment level. In Table 2.3 we report the results of ordinary least squares
regressions with the average relative back transfer as the dependent variable.
The dependent variable is relative back transfer, defined as the share of
points returned over points received (i.e., the quadrupled investment). Thus,
a choice of “nothing” is equivalent a relative back transfer of 0 percent, the
choice of “compensate” translates into a relative back transfer of 25 percent
and the choice of “equalize” means that 62.5 percent of the received points
are sent back by the trustee. For example, with an investment level of 4, the
trustee receives 4× 4 = 16 points and sends back 10 if he chooses “equalize”,
giving a payoff of 16 to each of the two players; the relative back transfer
equals 10/16 = 62.5 percent. Likewise, if the investor sends 10, the trustee
receives 40 and sends back 25 in the case of “equalize”, which yields a rela-
tive back transfer of 25/40 = 62.5 percent. The advantage of using relative
back transfers is that a given choice, such as “equalize”, implies the same
percentage number regardless of the investment level. Thus, our regressions
implicitly estimate the conditional frequency of the three choices “nothing”,
“compensate” and “equalized”. The regressors are described in Table 2.4.
Model (1) in Table 2.3 reports the result of a regression that takes the
average relative back transfer per matching group as the dependent variable.
The independent variables in this regression are the average investment per
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Table 2.3: OLS regression analysis of trustee decisions. Models (1) and (2)
use aggregated data on the matching group and trustee level, respectively,
i.e., the variables are averages on the matching group and trustee level, re-
spectively. In model (1), ‘Mach’ and ‘Fairness’ represent matching group
averages.
Dependent variable:
relative back transfer (1) (2) (3)
(Mean of) Investment level 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.018***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Implicit −0.013 −0.040 −0.038
(0.020) (0.033) (0.036)
Explicit 0.170*** 0.107** 0.203***
(0.029) (0.039) (0.038)
(Mean of) Mach 0.062 −0.086* −0.081*
(0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
Mach × implicit 0.061 0.057
(0.055) (0.056)
Mach × explicit 0.110** 0.105**
(0.048) (0.049)
(Mean of) Fairness −0.108** −0.112* −0.109*
(0.043) (0.056) (0.054)
Fairness × implicit −0.000 −0.006
(0.062) (0.062)
Fairness × explicit 0.007 −0.018
(0.064) (0.061)
Explicit × last 3 −0.176***
(0.032)
Period −0.006***
(0.002)
Constant 0.049 0.113** 0.230***
(0.051) (0.045) (0.031)
N 24 144 1440
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching groups in models (2) and (3)).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Description of regressors
Investment Level number of points the investor transfers
Implicit, Explicit dummies for the respective treatments (omitted cate-
gory: baseline treatment)
Mach dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant scored
above the median in the Mach-IV inventory
Fairness dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant’s an-
swer to the fairness question was above the median
response (i.e., if the subject’s fairness standard is be-
low the median)
Explicit × last 3 dummy that equals 1 if the observation comes from
periods 8, 9 or 10 in the explicit treatment. Its pur-
pose is to capture the end-game effect that occurs
when the future benefits from reputation vanish to-
wards the end of the experiment
Period denotes the experimental period (from 1 to 10)
matching group, dummy variables for the implicit cue and the explicit rep-
utation treatment, the average Mach score of the trustees in the matching
group, and the average response to the fairness question (high answer in-
dicates low fairness norm). In all regressions, the omitted category is the
baseline dummy, implying that the constant measures the average relative
back transfer in the baseline condition, while the dummy for the implicit cue
(explicit reputation) condition measures the difference between the baseline
condition and the implicit cue (explicit reputation) condition.
Regression (1) is the most conservative because the unit of observation
is average behavior in a matching group, giving us 24 observations in total.
We find a highly significant positive effect of the investment level, i.e., higher
investments generate higher relative back transfers. For our purposes, the
most important result of regression (1) is the small and insignificant effect
of the dummy for the implicit treatment. The coefficient for this dummy
is close to zero, highly insignificant (p = 0.533) and even has the “wrong”
sign, indicating that eye spots certainly have no positive effect on trustees’
back transfers. In addition, we find a significant (p = 0.021) effect of the
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fairness standard in the baseline condition, i.e., subjects with a lower fairness
standard tend to make lower back transfers.
In regression (2), we examine the mean relative back transfer on the
individual level. This yields 144 observations, as we have 36 trustees in the
explicit reputation treatment (“explicit”) and 54 in each of the other two
conditions (standard errors are clustered at the matching group level). In
models (2) and (3), Mach score and Fairness represent dummies for subjects
with an above-median Mach score and a below-median fairness standard;
recall that subjects with a below-median fairness standard are those who give
a high (above-median) rating on the fairness question. Interestingly, this has
little effect on the impact of the investment level and implicit cue condition:
we get virtually the same result as in model (1), with respect to both the size
and the significance of these coefficients. In particular, the coefficient of the
implicit cue treatment is still very small, insignificant (p = 0.242) and has
the wrong sign. However, because of the larger number of observations, the
fairness standard and individuals’ Mach score is now almost significant at the
five-percent level (both p = 0.056); subjects with lower fairness standards and
a higher Mach score transfer back less in the baseline condition. We are also
able to examine the interaction between the fairness standard, the Mach score
and the implicit cue condition in regression (2). The interaction between
the fairness standard and the implicit cue condition is clearly insignificant
(p = 0.998); the same holds for the Mach score (p = 0.279). This indicates
that the implicit cue condition also does not cause behavioral changes in
trustees with different fairness standards and different Mach scores.
Finally, we take the decisions in each period as units of observation and
cluster again on matching groups in model (3). The dependent variable
is now the individual relative back transfer in a period, which limits the
observations to 0, 25 or 62.5 percent of the received amount. In model (3),
we also include variables that capture time effects.
The results of model (3) are interesting in several respects. First, and
most importantly, the coefficient for the implicit cue treatment remains small
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in magnitude and insignificant (p = 0.304), and again has the wrong sign.
Second, subjects who have a low fairness standard contribute less in the
baseline condition (p = 0.054). Third, subjects with a high Mach score
also contribute less in the baseline condition (p = 0.076). Both the second
and the third effect are substantial, reducing the mean relative back transfer
by between 8 and 11 percent. Fourth, the interaction between the implicit
cue condition and the below-median fairness standard/above-median Mach
dummy is not significant (p = 0.921 and p = 0.319, respectively), indicating
that individuals with a low fairness standard/high Mach score do not respond
differently to the implicit reputation cue compared with individuals with a
high fairness standard/low Mach score. Thus, there is no evidence that
individuals who score low on selfishness and opportunism are more prone to
implicit reputation cues. Both high and low Mach individuals show little
response to the implicit reputation cue.
2.4.2 Explicit Reputation Incentives
In this subsection, we examine the effect of pecuniary reputation incentives
on the trustees’ back transfers and the investors’ transfer. Table 2.2 shows
that—in contrast to the implicit reputation condition—the explicit reputa-
tion condition causes an enormous increase in average back transfers, from
6.28 to 13.86. While the modal response in the baseline condition is “nothing”,
the modal response in the explicit reputation condition is “equalize”. This big
change in the trustees’ back transfers is highly significant (p = 0.002, Mann-
Whitney U test) and led to a significant increase in the investors’ transfers,
from 5.88 to 7.74 (p = 0.006, Mann-Whitney U test). In the explicit condi-
tion, the maximum investment also represents the median investment choice.
This strong impact of pecuniary reputation incentives can also be seen in Fig-
ure 2.2a. The average back transfer is much higher in the explicit reputation
condition in all but the last few periods. The time path of the average back
transfer in Figure 2.2a also indicates the relatively high degree of rationality
that seems to be present in our experiment. During the early periods, a
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high back transfer generates a good reputation for many remaining periods,
implying that the pecuniary return of a good reputation is high. During
the final few periods, a high back transfer generates a good reputation only
for a few remaining periods, implying that the pecuniary return of a good
reputation is lower. Thus, individuals who understand this should choose
lower back transfers during the final few periods because the selfish returns
of behaving in this way are lower. The time pattern of back transfers in
Figure 2.2a is consistent with this rational choice argument.
Interestingly, in period 10 of the explicit reputation condition—in which
there are no pecuniary reputation incentives at all—the average level of back
transfers is very similar to the level in the other two conditions (in which
explicit reputation incentives are absent by design). Thus, the trustees seem
to understand the logic of pecuniary reputation incentives quite well: while
they do not respond to merely implicit reputation cues that carry no explicit
incentive power, they respond strongly to explicit reputation incentives, and
they seem to understand when they can gain from a good reputation and
when not.
The powerful effect of pecuniary reputation incentives can also be seen
in Figure 2.2b: at every investment level, trustees’ back transfers are higher
than in the other two conditions.
Finally, the regressions in Table 2.3 provide further statistical support for
the large effect of the explicit reputation condition. In models (1) and (2),
the explicit reputation incentive increases the average relative back transfer
by 17.6 and 16.2 percentage points, respectively (p < 0.001 and p = 0.012).
Note that in model (3) the inclusion of the “explicit × last 3” interaction
implies that the “explicit” variable captures the effect of the explicit reputa-
tion incentive for the first seven periods while the variable “explicit × last 3”
measures the decrease of back transfers during the final three periods. The
coefficient of 0.203 (p < 0.001) for the variable “explicit” thus indicates that
in the first seven periods subjects increase the relative back transfer relative
to the baseline condition by 20.3 percentage points if they face an explicit
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reputation incentive. Moreover, highly opportunistic trustees (above-median
Mach score) show an increase in relative back transfers that is 10.5 percent-
age points larger when they face an explicit incentive (coefficient of 0.105;
p = 0.044). Taken together, these results indicate a large effect of the explicit
reputation incentive, an effect that contrasts sharply with the null effect of
the implicit reputation cue. In fact, an F-test indicates that the difference
between the coefficients of the implicit and the explicit condition is highly
significant (p < 0.001).
Subjects scoring high on the Machiavellianism scale exhibit lower back
transfers in the baseline condition than the low Mach subjects, but they also
respond more strongly to the explicit reputation incentive. This response
pattern then raises the question whether there is a difference in the back
transfer level between low Mach and high Mach subjects in the explicit rep-
utation condition. We tested the Null hypothesis of no difference in the level
of relative back transfers with an F-test and found that the hypothesis can-
not be rejected (p = 0.312). Thus, in the presence of explicit reputation
incentives, the back transfer behavior of low and high Mach subjects is in-
distinguishable because the latter compensate for their lower back transfers
in the absence of an explicit incentive with a higher response to the explicit
incentive.
The above results confirm the hypothesis that Machiavellian subjects re-
spond particularly strongly to social punishment threats such as loss of repu-
tation. This finding is consistent with the results of another study (Simpson
and Willer, 2008) that also observes that egoistic subjects show a stronger
response to pecuniary reputation incentives.
2.5 Conclusion
There is little disagreement among researchers that explicit reputation in-
centives strongly affect human prosocial behavior. These explicit incentives
can take the form of higher future material benefits in a dynamic experimen-
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tal game—such as in our explicit reputation treatment—or they can arise
when real people (e.g., an audience) saliently observe other people’s cooper-
ative or non-cooperative behavior (Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Rege and Telle,
2004; Kurzban et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009). The strength of merely im-
plicit reputation cues, in which subjects cannot really acquire a good or bad
reputation, is, however, much less investigated.
Therefore, we examined the impact of such cues on the strongly reciprocal
behavior of trustees in a trust game. Previous work has argued that eye cues
activate reputation concerns, but did not compare the effect of eye cues with
the effect of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. If reputation concerns
shaped humans’ altruistic inclinations in ancestral environments to the extent
suggested in some of the recent literature (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Burnham
and Hare, 2007)—that is, if humans are indeed so sensitive to reputation cues
that they respond to them even if the cues carry, in fact, no real pecuniary
incentive power—subjects should generate patterns in the eye cue condition
that resemble the effects of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives.
However, our results indicate that eye cues, which have been hypothesized
to represent reliable indicators of potential observability of one’s behavior
over the course of human evolution, have no effect at all on the trustees’
altruistic behavior. The effect of the implicit cues treatment is close to zero,
highly insignificant and even has the wrong sign. Moreover, this null ef-
fect holds regardless of whether we examine the response of subjects who
score high or low on the Mach scale. Our results therefore suggest an ex-
tremely cautious view of claims that most of the observed prosocial behavior
in anonymous one-shot games should be attributed to uncontrolled implicit
reputation cues. At the current state of our knowledge, this claim represents
no more than a speculation, lacking empirical support. If it were indeed the
case that uncontrolled reputation cues are so important, behavior should also
respond to experimentally controlled implicit reputation cues.
The null effect of the implicit reputation cue contrasts sharply with the
large impact of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives on trustees’ behavior.
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The large contrast between the implicit and the explicit reputation condition
reinforces our conclusions above. The effect of the implicit cue does not
even resemble the effect generated by the pecuniary reputation incentive,
suggesting that implicit cues are a relatively weak force.
We also found important individual differences in subjects’ responses to
the pecuniary reputation incentive. Subjects who score high on the Mach
scale behave less altruistically in the baseline treatment, but they respond
more strongly to the pecuniary reputation incentive.
Why do other studies find an effect of eye cues on prosocial behavior
while we find none? With regard to the studies of Bateson et al. (2006) and
Burnham and Hare (2007), the following feature of their experiments might
have caused the difference. Both experiments investigate contributions to
a public good. As shown above, many people are conditional cooperators,
and their contributions therefore depend on their beliefs about other people’s
contributions. Eye cues could generate more optimistic beliefs about other
subjects’ cooperation behavior, which then induce higher cooperation rates
among subjects with preferences for conditional cooperation. This contrasts
with our study in which we have full control over subjects’ beliefs because the
trustees know exactly the investment level if they make their back transfer.
Therefore, in our study, eye cues cannot affect beliefs about other subjects’
behavior.
With regard to the study of Bateson et al. (2006)—a field experiment
about voluntary contributions to an honesty box in a university coffee room—
another feature is also potentially important. Subjects often consume coffee
jointly and observe whether their colleagues pay for the coffee. In this case
the subject’s real reputation—and not just its imagined reputation—is at
stake. If eye cues draw attention to the moral appropriateness of paying for
one’s coffee, then this real reputation incentive may be greatly strengthened.
Thus, it is possible that the eye cues in the Bateson et al. (2006) experiment
enhanced the already prevailing incentive to maintain one’s reputation as an
honest coffee consumer. This feature of the Bateson et al. (2006) experi-
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ment also contrasts with our experiment because we rule out any interaction
between the eye cue and the pecuniary (explicit) reputation incentive.
Why did the eye cue affect the behavior in the dictator game experiment
of Haley and Fessler (2005) while lacking effect in our trust game? A possi-
ble reason for this may be that the dictator game constitutes a less robust
situation. Experimental economists now generally acknowledge that the dic-
tator game is likely to involve more experimenter demand effects (Bardsley,
2008) and is less robust than other games in which subjects interact with
each other (Cooper and Kagel, 2010). Therefore, relatively weak forces can
affect behavior in the dictator game. Perhaps the implicit reputation cue is
one of these weak forces.
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There is no single factor in the whole field of labor relations that does
more to break down morale, create individual dissatisfaction, encour-
age absenteeism, increase labor turnover and hamper production than
obviously unjust inequalities in the wage rates paid to different indi-
viduals in the same labor group within the same plant.
William H. Davis, National War Labor Board 1942–1946
in Kochan and Barocci (1985)
Experiment 3
The Relevance of Social
Comparison and Strong
Reciprocity for Economics
Summary This chapter reports a field experiment to test whether work-
ers respond to wage cuts and whether their response depends on coworkers’
wages. Workers were organized in teams of two and paid a flat wage. Ei-
ther one or both workers in a team suffered a wage cut, while workers in the
control treatment continued to earn the initial wage. We show in a difference-
in-differences analysis that cutting both workers’ wage reduced work perfor-
mance significantly. However, cutting only one worker’s wage resulted in a
decrease in performance that was twice as large. In contrast, the spared
worker’s performance remained unaffected. These findings corroborate the
fair wage-effort hypothesis, which can explain involuntary unemployment and
wage compression.
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3.1 Introduction
Standard economic models of labor markets assume that workers respond
exclusively to economic incentives and only care about the absolute level
of income. These models do not take into account that fairness motives
and social comparison may determine worker behavior. The relevance of
these motivational forces, however, was long emphasized in social psychology
(Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1961; Adams, 1963) and sociology (Davis, 1959;
Runciman, 1966; Pollis, 1968). Textbooks on personnel management—like
Kochan and Barocci (1985)—also regard the need for fair and equitable treat-
ment of workers as obvious. These ideas have since been partially integrated
into the economic theory of labor markets. A well-known example is the fair
wage-effort model by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) which states that workers’
fairness concerns constrain firms’ wage setting. The model draws on two key
assumptions: first, workers withhold effort when they perceive that they are
paid less than the fair wage, and second, the fair wage depends on the wages
paid to the coworkers in the same firm. Under these assumptions, the firm’s
wage setting may lead to involuntary unemployment and wage compression.
In this chapter we report evidence from a randomized field experiment
exploring whether workers respond reciprocally to wage cuts and the extent
to which wages paid to coworkers influence their responses. We conducted
the field experiment in collaboration with a firm that sells a card permit-
ting customers to attend parties at selected bars and nightclubs. The firm
hired workers for two weeks to sell a promotional card at a price of 5e or
in exchange for customer data. Workers had to work in teams of two.1 In
the pre-intervention week, all workers earned a flat base wage. In the post-
intervention week, teams were randomly assigned to one of three treatments:
in the control treatment, workers continued to earn the base wage; in the
second treatment, both workers in a team suffered a wage cut; in the third
treatment, only one randomly chosen worker in a team suffered a wage cut,
1Team members worked independently of each other, i.e., we observe the amount of
sold cards for each worker individually.
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while the other worker continued to earn the base wage. To rule out reputa-
tion incentives, workers’ employment was limited to two weeks without the
prospect of future employment.
We show that workers’ performance largely depends on the wages paid
to coworkers. When only one worker in a team suffered a pay cut while the
coworker was spared, performance of the worker with the lower wage declined
sharply by 34 percent. In contrast, when a worker suffered the wage cut along
with the coworker, work performance only decreased by 15 percent. This
difference in responses is highly significant. When workers were spared from
the wage cut while their coworker was not, the spared workers’ performance
was not affected.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first field experiment to exam-
ine the causal effects of wage differentials on worker performance. Empirical
evidence on the relevance of social comparison in the workplace has only
recently emerged, and the results are mixed. Previous findings stem pri-
marily from laboratory experiments. Aside from the debate whether results
from laboratory settings can be generalized to the field (Falk and Heckman,
2009), laboratory experiments entail additional issues when studying social
comparison.
For example, natural and salient references for comparison are poorly
induced because subjects in laboratory multi-worker firms typically do not
interact with each other on a personal level. It is thus not particularly sur-
prising that they often do not compare themselves with their coworkers in
this case. For example, in Gächter et al. (2008), subjects did not interact,
other than observing anonymous coworkers’ wages and effort levels before
choosing own effort. As a result, subjects did not respond to coworkers’
wages and effort levels. In our field experiment, we created a natural and
salient person for comparison by forming teams of two workers who were
employed together on two consecutive weekends.
Implementing unequal wages in the laboratory is problematic when sub-
jects play the role of the firm and workers are essentially identical. Wage
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differentials are then rarely observed because there is no basis for discrimina-
tion. To address this problem, Charness and Kuhn (2007) introduced produc-
tivity differentials among workers. Although unequal wages were common,
workers did not respond to wages paid to coworkers. Unequal wages might
not be perceived as unfair when workers know that they differ in productiv-
ity. Instead of implementing productivity differentials, Thöni and Gächter
(2009) applied the strategy method to elicit responses to wage differentials.
Their results lend some support for social comparison, but are inconclusive
on the whole. In our study, we exogenously introduced wage differentials
that were not justified by differences between workers. In fact, any justifica-
tion of wage differentials mitigates social comparison effects. For example,
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (forthcoming) justified unequal wages by informing
one group of workers that less money was available for them than for the
other group. This explanation may have made workers consider wage differ-
ences acceptable, therefore precluding a social comparison effect because the
fair wage-effort model posits that only wage changes that also affect wage
fairness induce effort variations. For this reason, we purposely left wage
differentials completely unjustified.
Non-experimental field studies are not better suited for identifying social
comparison effects because factors unobservable to the researcher may deter-
mine both wage differentials and effort choices (Shearer, 2003).2 We address
this endogeneity problem by randomizing wage differentials.
Much of our previous understanding about the harmful effects of wage
cuts on work motivation relies on laboratory experiments and manager inter-
views. Fehr and Falk (1999), for example, conducted a laboratory experiment
to investigate downward wage rigidity in competitive labor markets. They
find that firms fear low and unprofitable effort levels as a consequence of low
wages and are therefore reluctant to accept low wage offers from previously
unemployed workers. As a result, wages settle above the competitive level.
2Torgler et al. (2008) investigate the relevance of social comparison among basketball
and soccer players. They find that both situations – earning more and earning less than
teammates – reduce performance.
52
3.2. EXPERIMENT
Bewley (1999) provides an example for an interview study on wage stick-
iness. He reports that managers are reluctant to cut pay during a recession
because they are afraid of the negative effects on work morale. Although
interview studies are suggestive, the findings only reflect managers’ opinions
and not worker behavior.3
In a non-experimental study, Lee and Rupp (2007) examine the effects of
wage cuts on flight delays in the airline industry. They find that wage cuts
trigger hostile responses only when the cut is perceived to be unfair. In the
same way as for wage differentials, non-experimental field studies on wage
cuts do not solve the endogeneity problem. In addition, non-experimental
field studies examine worker behavior in ongoing employment relations, mak-
ing it difficult to disentangle fairness motives from reputation incentives
(Howitt, 2002).4
To date, only Kube et al. (2010) provide clean evidence on the negative
effects of wage cuts on worker performance. In their field experiment, workers
reduced their performance significantly when the wage was lower than the
promised wage.
3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Experimental Procedure
Economic Environment
We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a German firm that
operates a nightlife online portal and sells a card that permits attendance
to parties in selected bars and nightclubs. In 2008, the firm initiated a
promotion to increase its brand awareness. For this promotion, it hired
workers to sell a promotional card in public places and nightclubs.
3For example, managers may be reluctant to cut wages because they would have to
deal with offended workers who might contest the situation; this would not necessarily
imply, however, that the workers would work less.
4For example, when firms cut wages, workers may simply punish the firm with lower
effort as part of an equilibrium trigger strategy.
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Recruitment
Workers were hired over a job market database that listed workers with ex-
perience in promotion jobs. They were unaware that they were participating
in an experiment. To ensure this, we excluded applicants who knew someone
from the firm’s permanent staff. Hires received a guarantee that they could
work on two consecutive weekends. In order to eliminate reputation incen-
tives, it was made clear that there was no prospect of further employment at
the firm.
Upon arriving for the training session, workers were randomly allocated
to teams of two and randomly assigned to be either “worker 1” or “worker
2” in a team. Both workers, however, had completely identical tasks and
responsibilities. By forming teams of two workers who worked together on
two consecutive weekends, we created a natural and salient reference for
comparison, namely the coworker in a team.
Workers were then made familiar with the objective of the promotion, its
structure and procedures, and with the equipment and clothing. Further-
more, they were trained how to approach potential customers.
Task
Workers’ task was to sell the promotional card at a price of 5e or in exchange
for a customer’s personal information.5 Teams were assigned a fixed point-
of-sale which was either a shopping avenue or a nightclub. Working hours
were Friday and Saturday from 5pm to 8pm for public places and 11pm to
2am for nightclubs.
During these three-hour shifts, workers were mostly on their own and thus
had full discretion over the amount of exerted effort. Points-of-sale provided
5Customer information was recorded in a database, and invitations to join the online
platform were sent to the customers. False information could be identified and attributed
to the worker who had acquired it. Workers did not know, however, that the correctness
of customer information would be verified.
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an attractive opportunity to shirk because workers could unobtrusively con-
verse privately. In case of low sales, they could always claim that nobody
wanted the card.
Each team was managed by a team leader, who met the workers before
and after work shifts. Team leaders supplied workers with promotional cards,
assessed the points-of-sale (for example, number of club visitors), and looked
after the workers once or twice per shift. After the shifts, they collected the
revenues, customer information, and the remaining cards.6
3.2.2 Experimental Design
Treatments
We implemented a differences-in-differences setup with a pre- and a post-
intervention week and four treatment groups (HH, LL, HL1, and HL2). The
pre-intervention week permits the measurement of workers’ baseline perfor-
mance, thus controlling for worker heterogeneity. This baseline is important
because ability and therefore performance may vary strongly across workers.
In the pre-intervention week, all workers earned an hourly base wage of
12e. For the post-intervention week, we randomly assigned teams to one of
three treatments. In the control treatment, “HH”, both worker 1 and worker
2 continued to earn the hourly base wage of 12e.7 In the second treatment,
“LL”, both worker 1 and worker 2 suffered a wage cut down to 9e per hour.
In the third treatment, “HL”, only worker 2 suffered a wage cut down to 9e
per hour, while worker 1 still earned the base wage of 12e per hour (see
Table 3.1 for a summary of the treatments). Thus, treatment HL consists of
6Team leaders were permanent employees of the firm and each of them was responsible
for two to three teams. They received a comprehensive set of instructions about their
communication with the workers and the handling of potentially problematic situations.
In particular, they were instructed to treat all workers in the same manner and were
prohibited to motivate or rebuke individual workers. Excerpts from worker and team
leader instructions are reproduced in appendix C.1.
7Team leaders used the phrase “You continue to earn 12e per hour. This was the
manager’s decision.” and analogous phrases in the other treatments, see appendix C.1.
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Table 3.1: Hourly wages (in e)
Treatment HH LL HL
Worker 1 2 1 2 1 2
Pre-intervention 12 12 12 12 12 12
Post-intervention 12 12 9 9 12 9
two groups: group “HL1” was composed of workers 1 in treatment HL, while
“HL2” was made up of workers 2.
Team leaders did not give a reason for the wage cut to prevent altering
the wage that workers consider fair. For example, workers’ notion of a fair
wage could have changed if team leaders had told that the firm faced the
risk of bankruptcy. In addition, devising a cover story would have deceived
the workers, which would have been a departure from standard convention
among experimental economists.
Design Specifics
Three important aspects of this field experiment need to be stressed. First,
we implemented a wage cut so that workers earned, on average, at least the
promised wage. Thus, we initially raised all workers’ hourly wage from 10e
to 12e.8 This avoids ethical concerns associated with experimental pay cuts.
In addition, the wage increase helps prevent an attrition bias. Drop-outs after
a wage cut would be uninformative because they could be interpreted either
as a hostile response or the choice of an outside option because the wage had
fallen below a worker’s reservation wage. This initial wage increase, however,
is associated with the potential cost of mitigating the treatment effects.
Second, we adapted the organizational structure of the promotion to max-
imize the number of subjects. We ran the promotion twice, hiring different
8Upon being hired, workers were promised an hourly wage of 10e. Then, at the
beginning of the first shift, team leaders informed the workers about the wage increase. If
workers asked for a reason, they were told that the manager had made the decision.
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workforces each time.9 In addition, we ran the promotions in two cities and
at two different types of points-of-sale in each of the promotion drives. This
made some balancing constraints on the treatment assignment desirable.10
We assigned treatments evenly to the two promotion drives, cities, and types
of points-of-sale in order to minimize time, city, and location type-specific
differences across treatments. To maximize statistical power, each of the four
treatment groups comprised the same number of workers (i.e., treatment HL
comprised as many workers as treatments HH and LL together). We also ran
treatment HL at each point-of-sale: the first time at half of the points-of-sale,
and the second time at the other half (i.e., each point-of-sale was assigned
to treatment HL once and to either treatment HH or LL the other time).
Furthermore, we stratified treatment assignment by gender, and also formed
same gender teams to avoid confounds.11
Third, we allocated workers who knew each other to the same treatment,
thus preventing treatment contamination, i.e. communication among workers
from different treatments. However, we separated friends into different teams
to preclude friendship arrangements within teams. In addition, allocation of
teams in space and time was arranged so that teams from different treatments
could not possibly meet.
3.3 Hypotheses
Using a simple framework, we analyze how workers respond to wage cuts and
how their response depends on the wages paid to their coworkers. Consider
a firm that employs two identical workers—worker 1 and worker 2—for a
one-time job and pays them a flat wage. In return, each worker generates
revenue for the firm by exerting costly effort. The firm’s payoff per worker is
9Workers from the first promotion drive never had contact with workers from the second
drive.
10Assignment to worker 1 and worker 2 was randomized unconditionally.
11For example, HL2 workers in mixed-gender teams might reduce their performance
because they felt they were victims of sexual discrimination.
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revenue generated by the worker minus her wage. The worker’s payoff is the
wage minus her effort cost.
Assume first that workers exclusively maximize their own material inter-
est. The prediction is then straightforward: since workers receive a guaran-
teed wage that is not contingent on their performance, their effort will not
respond to a change in the flat wage as long as the wage remains above their
reservation wage.12
Now assume that in addition to their own material interest, workers care
about fairness. Their fairness perceptions can be based on either the actions
or outcomes of others.13 For example, workers could view a wage cut as a
hostile act by the firm and as a consequence reduce their effort. If only one
worker’s wage is cut, he or she could consider this act even more hostile and
further amplify the effort reduction. Alternatively, inequalities in outcome
might influence worker behavior. Outcome-oriented fairness models have the
advantage of being tractable. We therefore use the model of inequity aversion
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to generate our hypotheses,14 and to derive the
formal predictions in appendix C.2.
Suppose that workers dislike inequity when comparing their own payoff,
that of their coworkers, and the profit the firm earns. Not only effort cost,
but payoff comparison as well, determines a worker’s effort. Higher effort
decreases own payoff and increases the firm’s payoff, but leaves the coworker’s
payoff unaffected.
12Alternatively, a high wage could be regarded as a disciplining device for selfish workers
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984): workers provide high effort to avoid being fired and losing the
high wage. After a wage cut, workers decrease their effort because they have less to lose.
According to this model, effort decreases towards the end of the employment (end game
effect) and a wage cut decreases effort regardless of the coworker’s wage. This theory,
however, is improbable in our setup because there was no threat of firing.
13Action-oriented fairness models include Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006); outcome-oriented fairness models include Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Levine (1998) presents a type-based
fairness model.
14The purpose of our experiment is to provide causal evidence on the effect of social
comparison on work performance and not to discriminate between closely related fairness
models.
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Because both team members are paid the same wage in treatments HH
and LL, they will both provide the same effort to avoid inequity between
them. The firm, on the other hand, creates inequity to the workers’ advantage
by paying a wage to the worker. The higher this wage, the greater the firm-
worker inequity. Thus, inequity averse team members will provide the same
amount of effort, which will be higher in treatment HH than in treatment
LL.
In treatment HL, the firm pays worker 2 a lower wage than worker 1. In
this case, payoff comparisons both with the firm and with the coworker affect
effort choices. Consider worker 1 first: provided both workers exert the same
level of effort as in HH, worker 1 receives the same payoff as the firm but
a higher payoff than worker 2. Consequently, worker 1 could increase her
effort in order to reduce advantageous inequity with respect to her coworker.
This, however, would increase not only effort cost but also overall inequity:
while an increase in effort decreases the inequality between workers as worker
1’s payoff is reduced, it creates a larger inequality between her and the firm
through both a reduction in her own payoff and an increase of the firm’s
payoff. Worker 1 will therefore not exert more effort; as a result, HL1 effort
will be the same as in treatment HH.
Consider now worker 2: provided that both workers exert the same level
of effort as in HH, worker 2 receives a lower payoff than the firm and worker
1. Hence, reducing effort decreases not only effort cost but also inequity with
respect to both the firm and the coworker. In order to equalize payoffs with
respect to the firm, worker 2 would provide the same low effort level as in LL.
Yet, at this effort level, worker 2 still gets a smaller payoff than worker 1.15
If worker 2 further decreases her effort, she not only saves effort cost but also
reduces disadvantageous inequity with respect to her coworker; this comes
at the cost of a disparity between her and the firm to her advantage. This
cost, however, is small because envy looms larger than compassion. Worker
15Recall that a reduction in effort decreases inequity with respect to the firm more
effectively than inequity with respect to the coworker because own effort affects the firm’s
payoff but it does not affect coworker’s payoff.
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2 therefore provides less effort than when both workers earn the low wage;
consequently, HL2 effort is lower than in treatment LL.
In summary, the model generates the following hypotheses about the
change in effort from pre- to post-intervention week:
If workers are sufficiently inequity averse, then
(H1) workers in treatment LL decrease their effort after the wage cut.
(H2) workers in treatment group HL2 decrease their effort after the wage
cut more than those in treatment LL.
(H3) workers in treatment group HL1 do not change their effort after the
wage cut.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 96 workers in 48 teams. Table 3.2 shows that work-
ers were predominantly women (77 percent) and, on average, in their early
twenties (mean age: 20.7 years). All but one were German citizens; 29
workers, however, had a second nationality (mostly Eastern European). Of
the 96 workers, three workers got sick before any wage cut was announced
and missed out on the entire post-intervention week.16 No worker, however,
dropped out after the wage cut.
In total, workers sold 8750 promotional cards; mean sales were 22.8 cards
per three-hour shift and worker. Only 187 customers (2.1 percent) chose to
pay 5e for the card, while the remaining sales were generated by collecting
customer information. Of the 8563 sets of customer information, only 191
(2.2 percent) were false.
16These workers were replaced by spare workers who were treated in exactly the same
way as the replaced workers would have been treated. We exclude spare workers from the
analysis, however.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Treatment Group HH LL HL1 HL2 Total
# Workers 24 24 24 24 96
# Female 18 18 19 19 74
Age (mean) 20.5 21.2 20.2 21.1 20.7
# Reported sick 1 1 0 1 3
Performance (mean)
Pre-intervention 20.8 22.4 24.3 22.0 22.4
Post-intervention 22.8 21.4 26.5 18.4 22.3
Overall 22.3
3.4.2 Control Variables
We balanced the treatments over variables known in advance (promotion
drive, city, point-of-sale, and gender). Two particular factors, however, were
impossible to anticipate, namely how many customers the workers would
meet at the point-of-sale (demand), and heterogeneity in worker character-
istics. Both factors influence worker performance and can cause spurious
correlations in the data if they are not accounted for.
Based on their visits during work shifts, team leaders assessed demand
on a 5-point scale (-2 = low, 2 = high). We use this assessment to test
for systematic variation in demand across treatments. We cannot reject the
null hypothesis that demand was equally distributed across treatments (p =
0.23, Kruskal-Wallis test).17 Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in
demand (standard deviation: 1.19). In order to estimate the treatment effects
more precisely, we include demand as an additional control in the regression
analysis.
To control for worker heterogeneity, we implemented a difference-in-dif-
ferences design which allows us to include individual fixed effects in the re-
gression analysis.18 Many field studies report substantial heterogeneity in
17All p-values in this chapter are two-sided.
18As workers were always assigned to the same point-of-sale, individual fixed effects also
capture location-specific differences.
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worker ability and point out the importance of controlling for this hetero-
geneity whenever possible (Shearer, 2004; Fehr and Götte, 2007; Mas and
Moretti, 2009).
3.4.3 Treatment Effects
Workers could exert effort in two performance dimensions: quantity (cards
sold) and quality (correctness of customer information). Our measure of ef-
fort is quality-adjusted performance, defined as total number of cards sold
minus sales due to customer data that were verified as incorrect.19 With
random treatment assignment, we can estimate the average causal effect of
an intervention by comparing pre- and post-intervention differences in per-
formance across treatments. We first conservatively analyze the impact of
the treatments on performance by applying non-parametric tests. For conve-
nience, we present quantities as percentages of the average pre-intervention
performance ypre, resulting in the following hypotheses:
(H1) Workers in treatment LL reduce performance compared to those in
the control treatment:
yLLpost − y
LL
pre
ypre
<
yHHpost − y
HH
pre
ypre
(H2) Workers in treatment group HL2 reduce performance more than those
in treatment LL:
yHL2post − y
HL2
pre
ypre
<
yLLpost − y
LL
pre
ypre
(H3) Workers in treatment group HL1 provide the same performance as
19The empirical results do not change if we include incorrect customer data in the
analysis.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage change in sales from pre- to post-intervention week.
H1: change in treatment groups HH and LL;
H2: change in treatment groups LL and HL2;
H3: change in treatment groups HH and HL1.
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those in the control treatment:
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=
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Figure 3.1 shows the percentage change in performance from pre- to post-
intervention week by treatment. Performance in the control treatment HH
increased non-significantly by 8 percent relative to the pre-intervention av-
erage (p = 0.58, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test), which points to learning ef-
fects. Persuant to our hypotheses, we test for differences between this base-
line change and changes in the other treatments. Compared to the control
treatment, performance in treatment LL decreased non-significantly by 13
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percentage points (p = 0.37, Mann-Whitney U test), lending weak support
for hypothesis (H1). By contrast, a wage cut for only one worker had a
dramatic impact on performance: workers in the HL2 group significantly de-
creased their performance by 24 percentage points compared to the control
treatment (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U test). This reduction in performance
is also stronger than the decrease in the LL group (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney
U test), providing strong first evidence for hypothesis (H2): workers reacted
more drastically to wage cuts when the coworker was spared. Moreover, if
we compare the paired observations within HL teams, we see that HL2 work-
ers also reduced their performance compared to their coworkers (p < 0.01,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test). Finally, consistent with hypothesis (H3), the
spared coworkers hardly responded to the wage cut: HL1 workers increased
their performance by 2 percentage points compared to the control group
(p = 0.37, Mann-Whitney U test).
Our non-parametric analysis does not control for differences in demand
and worker characteristics. To address this issue, we estimate a difference-in-
differences regression model that uses the balanced panel data structure with
each worker as a panel unit and each team as an independent observation:20
log(yikt) = α + νi + θt + δDkt + β1I
LL
kt + β2I
HL1
kt + β3I
HL2
kt + ikt (3.1)
where log(yikt) denotes the logarithm of average performance of worker i in
team k and week t; the constant α captures the average pre-intervention
performance, νi represents individual fixed effects, θt captures the baseline
trend from pre- to post-intervention week, and Dkt controls for differences in
demand; Igkt are intervention dummies for whether the respective intervention
has affected treatment group g in week t (the omitted category is the control
group HH); finally, ikt is an idiosyncratic error term, which is clustered over
teams. Recall that individual fixed effects not only capture time invariant
differences across workers but also location-specific factors because workers
20For an exposition of difference-in-differences estimation, see Bertrand et al. (2004).
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Table 3.3: Treatment effects on performance
Dependent variable:
log(performance) (1) (2)
Post-intervention 0.058 0.090
(0.080) (0.074)
LL × Post-intervention −0.106 −0.145*
(0.090)) (0.079)
HL1× Post-intervention 0.034 0.015
(0.095) (0.089)
HL2× Post-intervention −0.306*** −0.342***
(0.103) (0.101)
Demand 0.117***
(0.034)
Constant 3.057*** 3.048***
(0.015) (0.015)
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 189 179
Adj. R2 0.202 0.312
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered over teams.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
were always assigned to the same point-of-sale.21
Table 3.3 presents the estimates for the treatment effects. Column (1)
presents the results for equation (3.1) omitting the control variable for de-
mand. The “Post-intervention” dummy represents the percentage change in
baseline performance from pre- to post-intervention week. The coefficient
of this dummy shows that performance in treatment HH increased non-
significantly by 6 percent (p = 0.47, t-test). The intervention dummies,
i.e. the three interactions “g× Post-intervention”, describe how the change
in performance differed with respect to the control group. In treatment LL,
the change in performance was 11 percentage points lower than in treatment
HH; this negative response is twice as large in magnitude as the baseline
21As expected, the fixed effects parameters are highly significant (p < 0.001, F-test).
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change, reaffirming hypothesis (H1). However, data are too noisy to reject
the null hypothesis of no difference between treatment HH and LL (p = 0.25,
t-test). Workers in the HL2 group, however, reduced their performance by
31 percentage points (p < 0.01, t-test) compared to treatment HH. They re-
sponded three times more strongly to the wage cut than workers in treatment
LL (p = 0.01, Wald test), which strongly corroborates hypothesis (H2). In
line with hypothesis (H3), workers in group HL1 did not significantly increase
their performance compared to the control group (p = 0.72, t-test).
In Column (2), we include demand as a control variable in order to reduce
residual variance.22 The coefficient of demand is highly significant (p <
0.01, t-test) and has the expected sign: the more potential customers, the
likelier workers could sell a card. The inclusion of the demand variable does
not qualitatively change the results. It allows us, however, to estimate the
treatment coefficients more precisely. As a consequence, the influence of the
wage cut affecting both workers is now significant at the 10 percent level.
The point estimates for the two wage cut interventions imply a performance
reduction of 15 percentage points for the LL group (p = 0.07, t-test) and
34 percentage points for the HL2 group (p < 0.01, t-test). The difference
between the LL and the HL2 group is again highly significant (p = 0.01,
Wald test). The coefficient for the HL1 group remains small and insignificant
(p = 0.87, t-test).
Taken together, the results in Table 3.3 weakly support hypothesis (H1),
but they strongly corroborate hypothesis (H2). The results demonstrate
that workers are not only concerned about their own wage. Rather, workers
compare themselves with their coworkers and respond more negatively to
wage cuts if they end up earning less than their coworkers. Finally, consistent
with hypothesis (H3), preferentially treated workers do not increase their
effort, pointing out the boundaries of social comparison effects.
22When demand is included in the regression, the number of observations decreases by
10 because the demand measure is missing for some shifts.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter reports evidence from a randomized field experiment investigat-
ing fairness motives and social comparison in a real-life employment situation.
When both workers in a team suffered a wage cut of 25 percent, performance
declined by 15 percent. We may even underestimate this effect. Workers may
have perceived the wage cut as less unfair because they initially received a
wage increase that partially outweighed the wage cut.
This result provides causal evidence on why firms often refuse to cut
wages even though excess labor supply exists and labor markets have not
yet cleared. The question about downward wage stickiness has played a
key role in a long-lasting macroeconomic debate starting with Keynes in the
1930s. Bewley (1999) was able to show that managers regard fairness as the
most important reason for downward wage rigidity. In Bewley’s interviews,
managers revealed that they were afraid of workers’ resentment in response
to wage cuts. To date, behavioral evidence for the fairness explanation is still
scarce because exogenous wage cuts are rarely observed.23 We fill this gap
by implementing randomized wage cuts in a real-life job of limited duration
to exclude explanations other than fairness.
Our main result demonstrates the key role of social comparison in the
workplace. When only one worker in a team suffered a wage cut of 25 percent,
the affected worker’s performance declined, on average, by 34 percent. This
effect is much stronger than the effect of the pay cut for all workers, even
though the wage was reduced by the same amount. This result provides
clear evidence for the conjecture that workers respond to wages paid to their
coworkers. In contrast, spared workers did not respond to the wage cut their
coworkers suffered. This asymmetric effect speaks to the results of a field
experiment by Cohn et al. (2009). They show that workers who feel overpaid
do not respond to wage increases, while workers who feel underpaid respond
with a performance increase.
23The only exception known to us is Kube et al. (2008).
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EXPERIMENT 3. SOCIAL COMPARISON AND RECIPROCITY
This chapter sheds light on why firms usually avoid paying some workers
less than others on the same job. In the 1980s, for example, airline com-
panies such as American Airlines, Delta, and Northwest introduced two-tier
wage systems where new hires were paid less than incumbent workers. These
wage policies, however, were phased out in the 1990s due to the resentment
of the workers as well as the high turnover these lower wages generated
(Card, 1997). The New York Times noted that two-tier wage systems have
“produced a resentful class of workers who in some cases are taking their
hostility out on customers” (Salpukas, 1987). Social comparison may also
affect strategic decisions of companies, such as mergers and acquisitions. For
instance, the acquisition of Piedmont Aviation by U.S. Airways entailed un-
expectedly high acquisition cost due to wage increases at Piedmont to U.S.
Airways’ more generous salary levels (Kole and Lehn, 2000). Such costly
measures are necessary to ensure internal pay equity. When General Electric
(GE) acquired NBC in 1986, for example, engineers at GE were angered by
the fact that their colleagues at NBC earned higher salaries (Camerer and
Malmendier, 2005). Our study provides causal evidence that wage dispari-
ties within firms also greatly damage workers’ productivity. This provides
a plausible reason why firms frequently prefer compensation practices that
maintain firm-internal equity such as wage compression (Akerlof and Yellen,
1990) and wage secrecy (Lawler, 1990).
Together, these two findings correspond to the behavioral relation be-
tween wages and effort levels described in the phenomenological model by
Akerlof and Yellen (1990).24 It is important to note that other efficiency
wage models, such as the well-known shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), cannot explain these results. In particular, this alternative model
does not predict that responses to wage cuts depend on coworker wages.
The present experiment focuses on one specific determinant of workers’
fair wage, namely coworkers’ wages. Although this may be the most im-
portant determinant, there may be others. For example, past wages may
24As shown in appendix C.2, this behavioral pattern can be derived from recently de-
veloped models of social preferences.
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influence what workers think they are entitled to (Kahneman et al., 1986).
Thus, fairness considerations may also have severe implications for the opti-
mal wage policy over time.
Another important aspect is the communication of wage policies. For
example, workers may be willing to accept wage cuts when they feel that they
are justified (Greenberg, 1990). Therefore, managers may prevent adverse
consequences following from pay cuts if they can thoroughly and sensitively
explain the reason for the wage reduction, for example in order to avoid
bankruptcy.
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Remember upon the conduct of each depends the fate of all.
attributed to Alexander the Great
Conclusion
Positive and negative reciprocity shape our behavior in many important ways,
Adam Smith writes in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”:
Gratitude and resentment, therefore, are the sentiments which
most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish.
To us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears
to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to de-
serve punishment, who appears to be that of resentment. (Smith,
2010)
Throughout the different chapters of my dissertation, reciprocity came in
various guises, as positive or negative reciprocity, as strategic or strong reci-
procity. One major driver of reciprocal behavior is the concern for one’s
good reputation: when future interaction partners have access to informa-
tion about past behavior, people become more cooperative and accentuate
their positive reciprocity.
Experiment 1 shows that the ability to translate reputation concerns into
actions is crucially tied to a particular brain region, the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. But even in the absence of explicit reputation concerns,
people show a substantial level of reciprocity, so called strong reciprocity.
Recent studies suggested that even this kind of reciprocity is mainly driven
by reputation concerns, albeit only implicitly. Experiment 2 shows that
strong reciprocity is not connected to the presence of implicit reputation
cues. This result calls certain theories into question that describe prosocial
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behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions as a non-adaptation of mental
programs of reputation building to modern social environments (Haley and
Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006). The reverse of cooperative behavior
and positive reciprocity is punishment out of negative strong reciprocity.
Experiment 3 shows that workers display negative reciprocity when they feel
treated unfairly. More importantly, the major indicator of wage fairness
turns out to be not absolute wage but wage relative to coworkers.
This last result has major welfare implications. What people consider as
fair determines their actions and produces reciprocity that can enhance effi-
ciency of economic interactions when complete contracting is infeasible. On
the other hand, reciprocity can impair social welfare when fairness percep-
tions prevent firms from setting wages more flexibly and from being trans-
parent about their wage policy. In the worst case, people who would like to
work remain unemployed because wages do not adjust to the market clear-
ing level.25 Economic research must design solutions to reduce involuntary
unemployment, and for this purpose, economists have to shed light on the
mechanisms that produce it. Experiment 3 highlights the role that field
experiments can play in this pursuit.
In order to explore the mechanisms behind reciprocal behavior, I have
applied three different empirical approaches—“standard” behavioral labora-
tory experiments, neuroeconomic laboratory experiments and controlled field
experiments—to explore why and how people cooperate. Only the combi-
nation of different methods can provide a full picture of the mechanisms of
human social interactions.
The Role of Neuroeconomics
The first study demonstrates how neuroeconomic methods can add a new di-
mension to findings from the standard behavioral laboratory by highlighting
the neural underpinnings of observed behavior. Recently, economists have
25At the time of writing, 23 million people in the European Union are unemployed
(Allen, 2010).
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doubted the relevance of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics for em-
pirical economics and economic modeling (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008, 2007).
These doubts rely on the view of economics as a positive science. The nor-
mative dimension—welfare economics—is only seen as a vehicle to spark new
descriptive research (for example, the finding that an institution is Pareto-
inefficient leads to research how inefficient institutions can persist). The
notion of welfare as based on the axiom of revealed preferences, according
to this line of argument, should not be taken too literally, and economists
should abstain from normative policy prescriptions:
Greater psychological realism is not an appropriate modeling
criterion for economics, and therapeutic social activism is not its
goal. Welfare analysis helps economists understand how things
are by comparing the existing situation to how things might have
been in a plausible alternative institutional setting; welfare theory
is not a blueprint for a social movement. (Gul and Pesendorfer,
2008, p. 36)
Their bottom line is that “the best way to understand welfare economics is to
view it as a part of positive economics” (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 475).26
While welfare economics in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer may often be
fruitful for finding reasons why inefficient institutions can persist, many in-
efficiencies may arise precisely because humans are not homines oeconomici,
because they are biased, use flawed heuristics in reasoning and have prefer-
ences that are more intricate than some economists may think. Economists
interested in the causes why some institutions are not well-behaved (in the
sense of standard economics) therefore need behavioral models of human in-
teractions that depart from the view of revealed preferences as an axiom and
develop a richer theory of decision-making.27 They are also likely to need
26A minority of economists actually sees economics based on the axiom of revealed
preferences as a normative science, and the profession of economists as a therapeutic
one (Landsburg, 2007; Friedman, 1995). They advocate libertarian ideologies and policy
recommendations.
27Bernheim and Rangel (2007) provide an exposition of “behavioral public economics”.
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neuroeconomic methods because these methods could provide a tool for de-
ciding in which situations a theorist can safely make the assumption that
choices reveal preferences and when this assumption must be rejected—in
other words, when it is safe to equate “decision utility” with “experienced
utility” and when it is not.28 And in cases where the revealed preferences
assumption has to be rejected, neuroeconomics can also help distinguish be-
tween different competing behavioral theories.
Besides being of scientific interest in their own right, insights into the bi-
ological principles of human decision-making can therefore inform normative
judgment by bridging the gap between preferences and choices. By removing
the need to infer preferences from choices, they can lead the way to a true
therapeutic purpose for economics. In other words, if neuroeconomic studies
reveal that a certain behavior is not the rational consequence of a prefer-
ence, but that a neurophysiological mechanism has caused the action to be
inconsistent with the preference, then therapeutic or paternalistic measures
to these persons’ own good may be justified.29
In chapter 1, for example, I have described how participants were physi-
ologically manipulated to act against their own better judgment. This find-
ing should make researchers more cautious to flatly equate “decision utility”
with “experienced utility”—although this abstraction is often useful—and
to derive premature policy recommendations from what seem to be revealed
preferences. Another example comes from my ongoing research (data unpub-
lished). It seems to be the case that the activity of a certain brain region—the
amygdala—is causally involved in the amount of trust one displays towards
another person. We show that subjects whose amygdala activity is exoge-
nously increased behave less trusting than control subjects. One could thus
speculate that people who display a very high amount of trust towards others
due to a hypofunctional amygdala should be protected from their naïveté be-
cause their behavior does not reveal a preference for trusting others. Rather,
28See Plassmann et al. (2007) for an example.
29An attempt to reconcile freedom of choice with therapy is minimally-coercive or “lib-
ertarian” paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008).
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it is just a symptom of a malfunctioning decision mechanism. In short, neu-
roeconomics is not a rival of standard economics; it is a complement that
promises to add a true normative component to economic thought.
The Role of Lab and Field Experiments
The last chapter of this dissertation applies the experimental approach to a
field setting. Recently, a debate about the virtues and vices of laboratory
and field experiments has been spawned. The economic laboratory has been
criticized for using unrepresentative and self-selected subjects, for using ar-
tificial environments and being prone to the Hawthorne Effect while field
experimentation has been portrayed as the remedy to these flaws (see for
example Levitt and List (2007)). Falk and Heckman (2009) reply that while
some of these charges may apply to lab experiments, first, they can be largely
addressed through well-designed control treatments, and second, they apply
to field experiments to much the same extent as to lab experiments. They
point out that in field experiments subjects may not be more representative
than in the lab, and that environments in field experiments are as specific
as those in laboratory experiments. They conclude that different “empiri-
cal methods and data sources are complements, not substitutes” (Falk and
Heckman, 2009, p. 537). One example for complementarities is that “the field
offers a large range of variations in X [environmental parameters, FS], which
are potentially relevant but hard to implement in the lab” while the lab offers
tight control (ibid.).
It is the purpose of the field experiment reported in chapter 3 to provide
evidence for social comparison and strong reciprocity in an ecologically valid
environment. In an experiment, it is crucial to create the relevant conditions
because environmental parameters may influence the existence and size of
a behavioral effect of a treatment. As explained in chapter 3, however, it
is hard to create the environment needed to observe this effect in the lab.
In contrast, the “natural” employer-employee relationship that we examine
in our field experiment is ideally suited to test Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990)
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fair wage-effort hypothesis. Experiment 3 is—to date—the only unequivocal
evidence for the existence of a social comparison effect. However, the study
is not meant to disentangle different candidate models of social comparison.
The discrimination between similar models requires exact measurement of
behavioral parameters under tightly controlled conditions, in other words, a
laboratory experiment.
By showing that people outside the laboratory strongly reciprocate both
positively and negatively in environments that are economically important to
them, chapter 3 attests the economic relevance of social preferences. More-
over, it reveals that many situational parameters—even if they are irrele-
vant for own payoff, like the payoff of another person—may influence how
people assess the fairness of the situation and how they will react. This
makes building accurate economic models difficult. Growing field evidence
like experiment 3, however, suggests that traditional economic modeling will
remain imperfect in predicting micro- and macroeconomic outcomes until it
augments the stark conception of homo oeconomicus to accommodate the
findings of behavioral and neuroeconomics that are able to capture the com-
plex motives of social behavior. The homo oeconomicus model of decision-
making is oftentimes a too simplistic view of the “conduct of each”, and thus,
traditional economics may end up predicting the wrong fate of all.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Experiment 1
A.1 Specifications of rTMS Implementation
rTMS was administered to the DLPFC for 15 min before subjects partici-
pated in the trust game (“off-line paradigm”) (Robertson et al., 2003), using
a Magstim Rapid Magnetic Stimulator and a commercially available figure-
of-eight coil (70-mm-diameter double-circle, air-cooled). For stimulation of
the right and left DLPFC, the TMS coil was placed over F4 and F3 using
the electroencephalogram 10-20 coordination system, as in previous studies
(Wout et al., 2005; Koch et al., 2005; Griškova et al., 2007). We chose this
approach because no previous fMRI data on this paradigm exist. We used
the real-time neuronavigation option for BrainVoyager QX 1.6 with the Ze-
bris CMS20S measuring system for real-time motion analysis (Zebris Medical
GmbH) to ensure correct placement of the TMS coil during the stimulation.
The stimulation intensity was set at 54% of the maximum stimulator output.
The coil was held tangential to the subject’s head with the handle pointing
rostrally. Subjects received a single 15-min, 1-Hz rTMS train (900 pulses)
over either the left DLPFC or right DLPFC, or sham stimulation using a
Magstim placebo coil, which looks identical to the real coil and also delivers
the characteristic “click” sound. Half of the subjects in the sham stimulation
group received sham rTMS over the right DLPFC, and half received it over
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the left DLPFC.
The rTMS parameters are well within currently recommended guide-
lines (Wassermann, 1998) and result in suppression of excitability of the
targeted cortical region for several minutes after completion of the rTMS
train (Robertson et al., 2003). Subjects performed the task immediately af-
ter the end of the stimulation train in the same laboratory room. Because
the subjects received the instructions for the game before the rTMS train,
it was possible to begin with the task about 30 s after completion of the
stimulation train, thus under the influence of the rTMS aftereffect.
A.2 Instructions for Participants
We administered four different instructions, tailored to the participants’ roles
(investor or trustee) and to the information condition (anonymous or reputa-
tion). Instructions were identical across stimulation conditions, i.e., a trustee
in the anonymous information condition was administered the same instruc-
tions regardless whether he received rDLPFC, lDLPFC or sham stimulation.
Note that these instructions are adapted versions from the instructions to
experiment 2, which was conducted prior to experiment 1. In the following,
all four instructions are shown in the original layout, translated into English.
The original German versions can be obtained from the author upon request.
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A.2.1 Investor instructions, anonymous condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations. 
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the end 
of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 20 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment plus 
the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will learn 
with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. Your role 
("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the experiment; you 
will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. You will not learn of the identity of 
the participants assigned to you, neither before nor after the experiment. In the same way, the 
other participants will learn nothing about your identity. 
The experiment consists of 15 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points to 
B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant A. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points. 
Your decision 
You can decide how many points you would like to transfer to participant B. The experimenter 
will quadruple each point you transfer to participant B. If, for example, you transfer 1 point to 
participant B, participant B will receive 4 points; if you transfer 7 points to participant B, then 
participant B will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Your point total:    10 – transfer 
Participant B's point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
You must decide which of four possible amounts you would like to transfer to participant B: 1 
point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. 
The following table summarizes the situation after you have made your decision and before B 
makes his or her decision.  
You transfer... Your point total Participant B's point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Participant B's decision: 
In the second stage, participant B will learn how much you have transferred to him. Participant B 
can now decide how much he would like to return to you. He can choose between three different 
possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As he received four times the amount of 
your transfer, this corresponds to the amount that you transferred. In this case, your point 
total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after B has made his 
decision: 
Participant B's transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
Your transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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The period terminates after participant B has decided how many points he will transfer to you. A 
screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting income 
for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to you 
in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood the 
rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the sum 
he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving each 
the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What are 
the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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A.2.2 Investor instructions, reputation condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations. 
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the end 
of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 20 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment plus 
the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will learn 
with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. Your role 
("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the experiment; you 
will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. You will not learn of the identity of 
the participants assigned to you, neither before nor after the experiment. In the same way, the 
other participants will learn nothing about your identity. 
The experiment consists of 15 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points to 
B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant A. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points. 
Your decision 
You can decide how many points you would like to transfer to participant B. The experimenter 
will quadruple each point you transfer to participant B. If, for example, you transfer 1 point to 
participant B, participant B will receive 4 points; if you transfer 7 points to participant B, then 
participant B will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Your point total:    10 – transfer 
Participant B's point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
You must decide which of four possible amounts you would like to transfer to participant B: 1 
point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. Before you make your decision, you will be informed 
about the decisions Participant B made in the last three periods. We will explain this process 
below, after you have learned of Participant's B decision possibilities. 
The following table summarizes the situation after you have made your decision and before B 
makes his or her decision.  
You transfer... Your point total Participant B's point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Participant B's decision: 
In the second stage, participant B will learn how much you have transferred to him. Participant B 
can now decide how much he would like to return to you. He can choose between three different 
possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As he received four times the amount of 
your transfer, this corresponds to the amount that you transferred. In this case, your point 
total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after B has made his 
decision: 
Participant B's transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
Your transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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The period terminates after participant B has decided how many points he will transfer to you. A 
screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting income 
for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
Before You determine your transfer to Participant B, you will be informed about the decisions 
Participant B made in the three previous periods. In particular, a list appears showing how many 
times B selected the options "transfer nothing", "transfer one-quarter", and "same number of 
points". If, for example, B opted for "transfer nothing" once, never chose "transfer one-quarter", 
and selected "same number of points" twice in the last three periods, the information for you will 
appear as follows. 
Participant B made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 0 
"same number of points" 2 
When you decide how much you want to transfer to Participant B, you also know what he 
transferred back in the previous periods. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to you 
in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood the 
rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the sum 
he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving each 
the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
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Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What are 
the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume a Participant B is in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. In 
the previous two periods, Participant B selected "same number of points". If Participant B opts 
for "transfer nothing" in period 3, which information will the next Participant A receive about 
Participant B in next period 4? Please answer this question by completing the empty fields in this 
table as Participant A will see them in the next period. 
Participant B made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" ______________ 
"transfer one-quarter" ______________ 
"same number of points" ______________ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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A.2.3 Trustee instructions, anonymous condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations. 
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 60 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the end 
of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 10 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment plus 
the 60 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will learn 
with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. Your role 
("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the experiment; you 
will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. You will not learn of the identity of 
the participants assigned to you, neither before nor after the experiment. In the same way, the 
other participants will learn nothing about your identity. 
The experiment consists of 15 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points to 
B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant B. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points. 
Participant A's decision 
Participant A can decide how many points he would like to transfer to you. The experimenter will 
quadruple each point A transfers to you. If, for example, A transfers 1 point to you, you will 
receive 4 points; if A transfers 7 points to you, then you will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
1 Translator's note: CHF 60.00 corresponds to $ 56.58, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Participant A's point total:    10 – transfer 
Your point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
Participant A must decide which of four possible amounts he would like to transfer to you: 
1 point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. 
The following table summarizes the situation after A has made his decision and before you make 
your decision.  
A transfers... Participant A's point total Your point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Your decision: 
In the second stage, you will learn how much participant A has transferred to you. You can now 
decide how much you would like to return to participant A. You can choose between three 
different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As you received four times the amount of 
A's transfer, this corresponds to the amount that A transferred. In this case, A's point total 
is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after you have made your 
decision: 
Your transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
A's transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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Picture: Your decision screen 
Use the laptop keys indicated above to enter your decision: 
x h: "transfer nothing" 
x j: "transfer one-quarter" 
x k: "same number of points" 
The period terminates after you have decided how many points you will transfer to Participant A. 
A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
You will also receive information on your decision screen showing which decisions you made in 
the last three periods. If, for example, you opted for "transfer nothing" once, never chose "transfer 
one-quarter", and selected "same number of points" twice, the information will appear as follows. 
You made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 0 
"same number of points" 2 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to you 
in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
You made the following decisions in the last periods 
No transfer 1 
Transfer one – quarter 1 
Same number of points 1 
Initial endowment 10 
Participant A's transfer 4 
You have 26 points available. 
Your transfer to participant A:
Remaining time [sec] 254 of 15 Period 
Transfer nothing 
h
Transfer one-quarter 
j
Same number of points 
k
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Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood the 
rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the sum 
he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving each 
the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What are 
the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume you are in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. In the 
previous two periods, you selected "same number of points". If you opt for "transfer nothing" in 
period 3, which information will appear in period 4? Please answer this question by completing 
the empty fields in this table as you will see them in the next period. 
You made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" ______________ 
"transfer one-quarter" ______________ 
"same number of points" ______________ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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A.2.4 Trustee instructions, reputation condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations. 
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 60 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the end 
of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 10 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment 
plus the 60 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will learn 
with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. Your role 
("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the experiment; you 
will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. You will not learn of the identity of 
the participants assigned to you, neither before nor after the experiment. In the same way, the 
other participants will learn nothing about your identity. 
The experiment consists of 15 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points to 
B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant B. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points. 
Participant A's decision 
Participant A can decide how many points he would like to transfer to you. The experimenter will 
quadruple each point A transfers to you. If, for example, A transfers 1 point to you, you will 
receive 4 points; if A transfers 7 points to you, then you will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
1 Translator's note: CHF 60.00 corresponds to $ 56.58, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Participant A's point total:    10 – transfer 
Your point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
Participant A must decide which of four possible amounts he would like to transfer to you: 
1 point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. Before Participant A makes his decision, he will be 
informed about the decisions you made in the last three periods. We will explain this process 
below, after you have learned of your own decision possibilities. 
The following table summarizes the situation after A has made his decision and before you make 
your decision.  
A transfers... Participant A's point total Your point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Your decision: 
In the second stage, you will learn how much participant A has transferred to you. You can now 
decide how much you would like to return to participant A. You can choose between three 
different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As you received four times the amount of 
A's transfer, this corresponds to the amount that A transferred. In this case, A's point total 
is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after you have made your 
decision: 
Your transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
A's transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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Picture: Your decision screen 
Use the laptop keys indicated above to enter your decision: 
x h: "transfer nothing" 
x j: "transfer one-quarter" 
x k: "same number of points" 
The period terminates after you have decided how many points you will transfer to Participant A. 
A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
Before Participant A determines his transfer to you, he will be informed about the decisions you 
as Participant B made in the three previous periods. In particular, a list appears showing how 
many times you selected the options "transfer nothing", "transfer one-quarter", and "same number 
of points" in the last three periods. If, for example, you opted for "transfer nothing" once, never 
chose "transfer one-quarter", and selected "same number of points" twice, the information for 
Participant A will appear as follows. 
Participant B made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 0 
"same number of points" 2 
When Participant A decides how much he wants to transfer to you, he also knows what you 
transferred back in the previous periods. 
You made the following decisions in the last periods 
No transfer 1 
Transfer one – quarter 1 
Same number of points 1 
Initial endowment 10 
Participant A's transfer 4 
You have 26 points available. 
Your transfer to participant A:
Remaining time [sec] 254 of 15 Period 
Transfer nothing 
h
Transfer one-quarter 
j
Same number of points 
k
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You will also receive the information on the decisions you made in the last three periods. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to you 
in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood the 
rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the sum 
he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving each 
the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What are 
the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume you are in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. In the 
previous two periods, you selected "same number of points". If you opt for "transfer nothing" in 
period 3, which information will your next Participant A receive about you in period 4? Please 
answer this question by completing the empty fields in this table as Participant A will see them in 
the next period. 
Participant B made the following decisions in the last three periods: 
"transfer nothing" ______________ 
"transfer one-quarter" ______________ 
"same number of points" ______________ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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A.3 Questionnaire
Measuring Subjects’ Fairness Judgments. Because we hypothesized
that rTMS to the right DLPFC would foster unfair behavior, we were inter-
ested in exploring whether rTMS also has a similar impact on the judgment
of unfair behavior or whether the notion of fairness remains unchanged, thus
creating a gap between judgment and choice. Directly after the completion
of the experiment, subjects had to answer the following question: “Please in-
dicate in the following how you evaluate the participant’s behavior: Assume
that a participant A has transferred 7 points to a participant B. Participant
B then chose the option ‘transfer nothing.’ How do you evaluate the fairness
of participant B’s behavior?” Responses to this question were given on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“very unfair”) to 7 (“very fair”).
Measuring Subjects’ Ability to Assess the Future Consequences of
Past Back Transfers. One alternative explanation for our findings could
be that rTMS of the right DLPFC does not remove the ability to override
immediate short-run benefits, but simply affects subjects’ ability to assess
the future consequences of previous back transfer behavior. To examine this
possibility, we asked subjects how many points (1, 4, 7, or 10) they would
expect an investor to transfer to a trustee who had opted twice for “equalize
payoffs” and once for transferring back nothing in the previous 3 periods. The
exact wording of the question was: “Assume that in the previous 3 periods,
participant B has chosen once not to transfer anything, and has chosen twice
to ‘equalize payoffs.’ How much do you expect the investor with whom B is
matched next to transfer to B?” Subjects’ response options were 1, 4, 7, or
10 points.
Fairness Judgment and Assessment of Future Consequences Across
Treatments. As mentioned in chapter 1, we found no significant differ-
ences across stimulation conditions in the answers to the two questions posed
earlier. The bar graphs in Figure A.1 illustrate the mean responses to the
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Figure A.1: Trustees’ responses to the two questions administered imme-
diately after the trust game. Error bars show standard error of the mean.
(a) Trustees’ fairness ratings.
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(b) Trustees’ assessment of the future con-
sequences of a profile of back transfers.
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fairness judgment question and the hypothetical investment question by stim-
ulation condition. Figure A.1a shows how subjects assessed the fairness of a
hypothetical trustee who returns nothing in response to an investor transfer
of 7 points on a 7-point Likert scale. Means (all p > 0.16, Mann-Whitney
U tests) and distributions (p = 0.38, Kruskal-Wallis test) do not differ sig-
nificantly across the stimulation groups. Figure A.1b shows how subjects
predicted the likely transfer of a hypothetical investor who observes that his
current trustee opted twice for “equalize payoffs” and once for transferring
back nothing in the previous 3 periods. Again, both means (all p > 0.78,
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Mann-Whitney tests) and distributions (p = 0.95, Kruskal-Wallis test) do
not differ significantly across the stimulation groups.
Measuring Subjects’ Impulsivity and Personal Norm of Reciprocity.
Approximately 10 days after the experiment, we sent the trustees a question-
naire that included the BIS and BAS scales developed by Carver and White
(1994) (24 items) and translated into German by Strobel et al. (2001). This
inventory investigates a subject’s impulsive reaction to aversive stimuli (BIS)
and rewarding stimuli (BAS). The questionnaire also included the 27-item
Personal Norm of Reciprocity scale of Perugini et al. (2003). Items in this
inventory explore a subject’s tendency to reward another person’s positive
behavior (positive reciprocity) and to punish negative behavior (negative
reciprocity). This questionnaire was translated at our institute and checked
by back-translation.
A.4 Regression Analysis
To investigate whether the decision of how much to transfer back differed
across stimulation conditions, we used GLS regression models. In the re-
gression models, the dependent variable is the fraction of received points
that the trustee transfers back. The dummy variables “right DLPFC” and
“left DLPFC” are included to model the baseline effect of the 3 stimulation
conditions (condition “sham” is the omitted category). The temptation to
defect—and thus the self-control effort required for reputation formation—is
largest if the investor transfers 10 points to the trustee. Thus, we hypothesize
that the required recruitment of right DLPFC is highest in this case, implying
that disruption of right DLPFC function is more likely to generate a behav-
ioral effect. For this reason, our regressions also include a dummy variable
for all those observations in which the investor actually transferred 10 points.
The differences in the effect of stimulation conditions on the back transfer
decision (for all situations in which the investor was sending 10 points) are
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then estimated by including the corresponding interaction terms. We inter-
act each stimulation condition (right DLPFC, left DLPFC, and sham) with
a dummy variable indicating an investment of 10 points. For example, the
interaction term between right DLPFC and an investment of 10 (denoted
“right DLPFC × investment = 10”) identifies the difference in the effect on
back transfers between the right DLPFC condition and the sham stimulation
condition (i.e., the omitted category) for the investment = 10 case. Note that
the incentive for reputation formation disappears in the last period because
the interaction between investors and trustees does not continue after period
15. Thus, we dropped the last observed period (period 15) from the data for
all experimental conditions and for all observed experimental participants.
Tables A.1 and A.2 give the results of GLS estimation for the anonymous
condition and the reputation condition, respectively. We present linear re-
gression models in these tables, but the results obtained by the corresponding
ordered discrete choice models for the 3 choice categories of the investor are
identical with the results given here. We use robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering on the subject level. We also include a random effect—assumed
to be normally distributed—for each subject in our sample. We estimated
various specifications of the regression model for each experimental condition
(reputation and anonymous), and report 4 specifications here. Specification
1 tests whether the effect of stimulation of the right DLPFC and the left
DLPFC differs from the effect of sham stimulation because the variable “sham
DLPFC × investment = 10” is the omitted category. In specification 2, the
variable “left DLPFC × investment = 10” is the omitted category; this speci-
fication tests whether the effect of stimulation of the right DLPFC and sham
stimulation differs from the effect of stimulation of the left DLPFC. In spec-
ifications 3 and 4 we also control for individual subjects’ fairness judgments,
impulsivity, and reciprocity norm.
In Table A.1, we see that the interaction term “right DLPFC× investment
= 10” is highly significant and negative in all 4 specifications. Specification 1
shows that, controlling for baseline differences captured by the variables right
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DLPFC and left DLPFC, in the investment = 10 case, subjects whose right
DLPFC was stimulated transferred back 11.4 percentage points less than
subjects in the sham stimulation condition. Similarly, specification 2 shows
that subjects in the right DLPFC condition transferred back 19.8 percent-
age points less than subjects in the left DLPFC stimulation condition. This
indicates that, regardless of whether we compare the effect of stimulation of
the right DLPFC with either the sham stimulation or stimulation of the left
DLPFC, stimulation of the right DLPFC had a significantly negative effect
on the trustees’ back transfers. However, the effects of left DLPFC and sham
stimulation on back transfers did not differ significantly from each other, as
demonstrated by the insignificant coefficient estimates of the dummy vari-
ables “left DLPFC × investment = 10” and “sham × investment = 10.”
As noted above, specifications 3 and 4 include further control variables
and reveal that those who judged the scenario described earlier fairer than
others tended to transfer back less. Including the control variables does
not mitigate the strength of the effect of right DLPFC stimulation on back
transfers.
Table A.2 shows the same 4 specifications as in Table A.1 for data from
the anonymous condition. We see no significant differences in the effects of
stimulation of the right DLPFC, stimulation of the left DLPFC, and sham
stimulation on back transfers, because the estimated coefficients of the vari-
ables “right DLPFC × investment = 10,” “left DLPFC × investment = 10,”
and “sham DLPFC × investment = 10” are always insignificant.
The estimations reported in Table A.1 and A.2 indicate a significant differ-
ential effect of rTMS across stimulations (right DLPFC, left DLPFC, sham)
in the reputation condition, but not in the anonymous condition. Does the
strength of this differential effect across stimulations also differ significantly
between the two experimental conditions, reputation and anonymous? To in-
vestigate this question, we pooled all data from both experimental conditions
(reputation and anonymous). We used the same four regression specifications
as in Table A.1 and A.2, and also interacted all variables with a dummy vari-
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able, “reputation,” that indicates the experimental condition (i.e., whether
or not an observation stems from the reputation condition). We report the
corresponding estimation results in Table A.3. We see that the interaction
of the factors “reputation × right DLPFC × investment = 10” is significant
and negative in all specifications, regardless of which control variables we in-
clude (p = 0.01 for differences in right DLPFC vs. sham stimulation effects
between experimental conditions in both specifications 1 and 3; p < 0.01
for differences in right DLPFC vs. left DLPFC stimulation effects between
experimental conditions in both specifications 2 and 4). In contrast, the in-
teractions for the other stimulations “reputation × left DLPFC × investment
= 10” and “reputation × sham × investment = 10” are insignificant in all
specifications. Finally, note that the coefficient of the dummy variable “rep-
utation” is always positive (0.25 in both specifications 1 and 2, and 0.22 in
both specifications 3 and 4) and always significant. This indicates that aver-
age back transfers in the reputation condition were 22 to 25 percentage points
higher in the reputation condition than in the anonymous condition; that is,
trustees cared greatly about their reputation when reputation formation was
possible.
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Table A.1: Reputation condition: GLS regression of the back transfer de-
cisions on indicators of the experimental conditions and other controls
Dependent variable:
relative back transfer (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right DLPFC −0.00295 −0.00295 −0.00789 −0.00789
(0.03479) (0.03479) (0.03565) (0.03565)
Left DLPFC −0.02785 −0.02785 0.00413 0.00413
(0.03697) (0.03697) (0.03714) (0.03714)
Investment=10 −0.10216** −0.01789 −0.10732** −0.03952
(0.03321) (0.03352) (0.03334) (0.03305)
rDLPFC × Inv.=10 −0.11380** −0.19807** −0.11095** −0.17875**
(0.04669) (0.04692) (0.04646) (0.04644)
lDLPFC × Inv.=10 0.08427 0.06780
(0.04719) (0.04674)
sham × Inv.=10 0.08427 −0.08427 0.06780 −0.06780
(0.04719) (0.04719) (0.04674) (0.04674)
Fairness Judgment −.06128** −0.06128**
(0.01637) (0.01637)
Impulsivity (BIS) −0.00864 −0.00864
(0.04164) (0.04164)
Impulsivity (BAS) 0.00629 0.00629
(0.04383) (0.04383)
Reciprocity (Positive) 0.04148 0.04148
(0.02186) (0.02186)
Reciprocity (Negative) 0.01750 0.01750
(0.01846) (0.01846)
Constant 0.49751** 0.49751** 0.35583* 0.35583*
(0.02550) (0.02550) (0.16407) (0.16407)
Observations 616/44 616/44 616/44 616/44
R-squared (within) 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Standard errors, clustered on subject level, in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.02
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Table A.2: Anonymous condition: GLS regression of the back transfer
decisions on indicators of the experimental conditions and other controls
Dependent variable:
relative back transfer (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right DLPFC −0.04169 −.04169 −0.08184 −0.08184
(0.05937) (0.05937) (0.06275) (0.06275)
Left DLPFC −0.02250 −0.02250 −0.03246 −0.03246
(0.06082) (0.06082) (0.06403) (0.06403)
Investment=10 0.00446 0.05210 0.00564 0.054225
(0.03857) (0.03543) (0.03879) (0.04714)
rDLPFC × Inv.=10 0.05848 0.01085 0.06325 0.014666
(0.04898) (0.04655) (0.04980) (0.04714)
lDLPFC × Inv.=10 0.04764 0.04859
(0.05237) (0.05237)
sham × Inv.=10 −0.04764 −0.04859 −0.04859
(0.05237) (0.05237) (0.05237)
Fairness Judgment −0.03649** −0.03649**
(0.01884) (0.01884)
Impulsivity (BIS) 0.02246 0.02246
(0.07246) (0.07246)
Impulsivity (BAS) 0.07697 -0.07697
(0.06358) (0.06358)
Reciprocity (Positive) −0.00427 0.00427
(0.04176) (0.04176)
Reciprocity (Negative) −0.00770 -0.00770
(0.04579) (0.04579)
Constant 0.25549** 0.25549** 0.50856 0.50856
(0.04576) (.04576) (0.35623) (0.35623)
Observations 602/43 602/43 588/42 588/42
R-squared (within) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on subject level, in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.02
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Table A.3: Pooled GLS regression of the back transfer decisions on indica-
tors of the experimental conditions and other controls
Dependent variable:
relative back transfer (1) (2) (3) (4)
Right DLPFC −0.04243 −0.04243 −0.07975 −0.07975
(0.05028) (0.05028) (0.05026) (0.05026)
Left DLPFC −0.02350 −0.02350 −0.03276 −0.03276
(0.05130) (0.05130) (0.05126) (0.05126)
Investment=10 0.00156 0.00156 0.00259 0.00259
(0.03884) (0.03884) (0.03893) (0.03893)
rDLPFC×Investment=10 0.06078 0.06078 0.06490 0.06490
(0.04971) (0.04971) (0.05051) (0.05051)
lDLPFC×Investment=10 0.05055 0.05055 0.05377 0.05377
(0.05291) (0.05291) (0.05269) (0.05269)
Reputation 0.25154** 0.25154** 0.22103** 0.22103**
(0.05115) (0.05115) (0.05028) (0.05028)
Reput.×rDLPFC 0.03685 0.03685 0.07298 0.07298
(0.06810) (0.06810) (0.06753) (0.06753)
Reput.×lDLPFC 0.00145 0.00145 0.03424 0.03424
(0.07000) (0.07000) (0.06919) (0.06919)
Reput.×Inv.=10 −0.12475** −0.10497* −0.12663** −0.11446**
(0.05101) (0.04877) (0.05100) (0.04848)
Reput.×rDLPFC×Inv.=10 −0.17306** −0.19284** −0.17430** −0.18647**
(0.06753) (0.06585) (0.06804) (0.06617)
Reput.×lDLPFC×Inv.=10 0.01978 0.01217
(0.07057) (0.07029)
Reput.×sham×Inv.=10 −0.01978 −0.01217
(0.07057) (0.07029)
Fairness Judgment −0.04238** −0.04238**
(0.01227) (0.01227)
Impulsivity (BIS) −0.00041 −0.00041
(0.04031) (0.04031)
Impulsivity (BAS) −0.04067 −0.04067
(0.03903) (0.03903)
Reciprocity (Positive) 0.02919 0.02919
(0.02196) (0.02196)
Reciprocity (Negative) 0.01408 0.01408
(0.01993) (0.01993)
Constant 0.25648 0.25648 0.27945 0.27945
(0.03852) (0.03852) (0.17066) (0.17066)
Observations 1,218/87 1,218/87 1,204/86 1,204/86
R-squared (within) 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Standard errors, clustered on subject level, in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.02
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Appendix to Experiment 2
B.1 Instructions for Participants
Instructions for the “anonymous” and the “implicit reputation” condition were
identical. The only difference between the two conditions was the presence of
implicit cues on the trustee screen. Thus, there are four kinds of instructions:
investor instructions in the “anonymous”/”implicit reputation” condition; in-
vestor instructions in the “explicit reputation” condition; trustee instructions
in the the “anonymous”/”implicit reputation” condition; trustee instructions
for the “explicit reputation” condition.1
1Note that the instructions for experiment 1 are based on the instructions presented
here.
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B.1.1 Investor instructions, anonymous/implicit repu-
tation condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations.
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the 
end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 20 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment 
plus the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will 
learn with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. 
Your role ("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the 
experiment; you will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. 
The experiment consists of 10 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points 
to B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant A. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points.
Your decision 
You can decide how many points you would like to transfer to participant B. The 
experimenter will quadruple each point you transfer to participant B. If, for example, you 
transfer 1 point to participant B, participant B will receive 4 points; if you transfer 7 points to 
participant B, then participant B will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
                                                          
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Your point total:    10 – transfer 
Participant B's point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
You must decide which of four possible amounts you would like to transfer to participant B: 1 
point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. 
The following table summarizes the situation after you have made your decision and before
B makes his or her decision.  
You transfer... Your point total Participant B's point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Participant B's decision: 
In the second stage, participant B will learn how much you have transferred to him. 
Participant B can now decide how much he would like to return to you. He can choose 
between three different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As he received four times the amount of 
your transfer, this corresponds to the amount that you transferred. In this case, your 
point total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after B has made his 
decision:
Participant B's transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
Your transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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The period terminates after participant B has decided how many points he will transfer to you. 
A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to 
you in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood 
the rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any 
mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the 
sum he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What 
are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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B.1.2 Investor instructions, explicit reputation condi-
tion
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations.
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the 
end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 20 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment 
plus the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will 
learn with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. 
Your role ("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the 
experiment; you will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment. 
The experiment consists of 10 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points 
to B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant A. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points.
Your decision 
You can decide how many points you would like to transfer to participant B. The 
experimenter will quadruple each point you transfer to participant B. If, for example, you 
transfer 1 point to participant B, participant B will receive 4 points; if you transfer 7 points to 
participant B, then participant B will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
                                                          
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Your point total:    10 – transfer 
Participant B's point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
You must decide which of four possible amounts you would like to transfer to participant B: 1 
point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. Before you make your decision, you will be informed 
about the decisions Participant B made in the previous periods. We will explain this process 
below, after you have learned of Participant's B decision possibilities. 
The following table summarizes the situation after you have made your decision and before
B makes his or her decision.  
You transfer... Your point total Participant B's point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Participant B's decision: 
In the second stage, participant B will learn how much you have transferred to him. 
Participant B can now decide how much he would like to return to you. He can choose 
between three different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As he received four times the amount of 
your transfer, this corresponds to the amount that you transferred. In this case, your 
point total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after B has made his 
decision:
Participant B's transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "Transfer one-quarter" "Same number of points" 
Your transfer: You: B: You: B: You: B: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
Before you determine your transfer to Participant B, you will be informed about the decisions 
Participant B made in the previous periods. In particular, a list appears showing how many 
times B selected the options "transfer nothing", "transfer one-quarter", and "same number of 
points". If, for example, B opted for "transfer nothing" once, twice "transfer one-quarter", and 
selected "same number of points" three times, the information for you will appear as follows. 
Participant B has made 6 decisions so far: 
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 2 
"same number of points" 3 
When you decide how much you want to transfer to Participant B, you also know what he 
transferred back in the previous periods. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to 
you in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood 
the rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any 
mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the 
sum he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
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Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What 
are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total: ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume a Participant B is in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. 
In the previous two periods, Participant B selected "same number of points". If Participant B 
opts for "transfer nothing" in period 3, which information will the next Participant A receive 
about Participant B in next period 4? Please answer this question by completing the empty 
fields in this table as Participant A will see them in the next period. 
Participant B has made __ decisions so far:
"transfer nothing" ___ 
"transfer one-quarter" ___ 
"same number of points" ___ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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B.1.3 Trustee instructions, anonymous/implicit reputa-
tion condition
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations.
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the 
end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 10 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment 
plus the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will 
learn with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. 
Your role ("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the 
experiment; you will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment.  
The experiment consists of 10 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points 
to B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant B. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points.
Participant A's decision 
Participant A can decide how many points he would like to transfer to you. The experimenter 
will quadruple each point A transfers to you. If, for example, A transfers 1 point to you, you 
will receive 4 points; if A transfers 7 points to you, then you will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
                                                          
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Participant A's point total:    10 – transfer 
Your point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
Participant A must decide which of four possible amounts he would like to transfer to you: 
1 point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points.
The following table summarizes the situation after A has made his decision and before you 
make your decision.  
A transfers... Participant A's point total Your point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Your decision: 
In the second stage, you will learn how much participant A has transferred to you. You can 
now decide how much you would like to return to participant A. You can choose between 
three different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As you received four times the amount 
of A's transfer, this corresponds to the amount that A transferred. In this case, A's 
point total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after you have made 
your decision: 
Your transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "transfer nothing" "transfer nothing" 
A's transfer: A: You: A: You: A: You: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
The period terminates after you have decided how many points you will transfer to Participant 
A. A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
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You will also receive information on your decision screen showing which decisions you made 
in the previous periods. If, for example, you opted for "transfer nothing" once, chose "transfer 
one-quarter" twice, and selected "same number of points" three times, the information will 
appear as follows. 
Participant B has made 6 decisions so far:
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 2 
"same number of points" 3 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to 
you in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood 
the rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any 
mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the 
sum he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What 
are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
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A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume you are in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. In the 
previous two periods, you selected "same number of points". If you opt for "transfer nothing" 
in period 3, which information will appear in period 4? Please answer this question by 
completing the empty fields in this table as you will see them in the next period. 
Participant B has made ___ decisions so far:
"transfer nothing" ___ 
"transfer one-quarter" ___ 
"same number of points" ___ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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B.1.4 Trustee instructions, explicit reputation condi-
tion
General instructions for participants 
You are now participating in an economic experiment that is funded by a number of research 
foundations.
Please read these instructions carefully. They will explain everything to you that you need for 
participation in the experiment. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer any questions at your work place. In all other cases, communication between the 
participants is strictly prohibited during the entire experiment.  
At the beginning of the experiments, all participants will receive an initial endowment of 10 
Swiss francs1. Any points you earn during the experiment will be converted to francs at the 
end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies: 
1 point = 10 centimes 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the income you earned during the experiment 
plus the 10 Swiss francs initial endowment paid in cash. 
The experiment 
In this experiment, a participant A is always paired with a participant B. No participant will 
learn with whom he was in any group of two, i.e. all decisions will be made anonymously. 
Your role ("participant A" or "participant B") will be determined at the beginning of the 
experiment; you will retain this role for the duration of the entire experiment.  
The experiment consists of 10 periods; a different participant will be assigned to you in each 
period. This means that you will only meet each participant once at most. 
Each period consists of two steps: in the first step, participant A transfers an amount of points 
to B. Participant B can transfer points back to A in the second step. 
You are a participant B. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant – A and B – receives an endowment of 10 
points.
Participant A's decision 
Participant A can decide how many points he would like to transfer to you. The experimenter 
will quadruple each point A transfers to you. If, for example, A transfers 1 point to you, you 
will receive 4 points; if A transfers 7 points to you, then you will receive 7 x 4 = 28 points. 
                                                          
1 Translator's note: CHF 10.00 corresponds to $ 9.43, situation September 1, 2009. 
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The following intermediate point totals will thus result from your transfer: 
Participant A's point total:    10 – transfer 
Your point total:    10 + 4 × transfer 
Participant A must decide which of four possible amounts he would like to transfer to you: 
1 point, 4 points, 7 points, or 10 points. Before Participant A makes his decision, he will be 
informed about the decisions you made in the previous periods. We will explain this process 
below, after you have learned of your own decision possibilities. 
The following table summarizes the situation after A has made his decision and before you 
make your decision.  
A transfers... Participant A's point total Your point total 
1 point 9 14 
4 points 6 26 
7 points 3 38 
10 points 0 50 
Your decision: 
In the second stage, you will learn how much participant A has transferred to you. You can 
now decide how much you would like to return to participant A. You can choose between 
three different possibilities: 
x Transfer nothing. The point totals then remain unchanged. 
x Transfer one-quarter of the received amount. As you received four times the amount 
of A's transfer, this corresponds to the amount that A transferred. In this case, A's 
point total is again ten points, as it was at the beginning of the period. 
x Transfer the sum back that gives both participants the same number of points
(corresponds to a transfer of 62.5% of the points received). 
The following table lists the earnings in points at the end of the period, after you have made 
your decision: 
Your transfer: 
"transfer nothing" "transfer nothing" "transfer nothing" 
A's transfer: A: You: A: You: A: You: 
1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
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The period terminates after you have decided how many points you will transfer to Participant 
A. A screen showing income will then inform you about the decisions made and the resulting 
income for this period. A new period with a new participant will then begin. 
Before Participant A determines his transfer to you, he will be informed about the decisions 
you as Participant B made in the previous periods. In particular, a list appears showing how 
many times you selected the options "transfer nothing", "transfer one-quarter", and "same 
number of points". If, for example, you opted for "transfer nothing" once, chose "transfer one-
quarter" twice, and selected "same number of points" three times, the information for 
Participant A will appear as follows. 
Participant B has made 6 decisions so far:
"transfer nothing" 1 
"transfer one-quarter" 2 
"same number of points" 3 
When Participant A decides how much he wants to transfer to you, he also knows what you 
transferred back in the previous periods. 
At the end of the experiment, your point income will be converted to francs and paid out to 
you in cash. 
Do you have any questions? 
Test questions 
Please solve the following test questions. Your answers will have no consequence on your 
earnings; the questions only serve to see if all participants in the experiment have understood 
the rules. Please include all the steps of your calculations; this will aid us in finding any 
mistakes. 
Question 1: Assume participant A transfers B 7 points. B then transfers A one-quarter of the 
sum he received. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 2: Assume participant A transfers B 1 point. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 3: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A zero points. What 
are the income totals for this period? 
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A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 4: Assume participant A transfers B 10 points. B then transfers A the amount giving 
each the same number of points. What are the income totals for this period? 
A's point total:  ____________________________ 
B's point total:  ____________________________ 
Question 5: Assume you are in period 3 and must make a decision for this period. In the 
previous two periods, you selected "same number of points". If you opt for "transfer nothing" 
in period 3, which information will your next Participant A receive about you in period 4? 
Please answer this question by completing the empty fields in this table as Participant A will 
see them in the next period. 
Participant B has made ___ decisions so far:
"transfer nothing" ___ 
"transfer one-quarter" ___ 
"same number of points" ___ 
Please raise your hand once you have solved the test questions. 
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Appendix to Experiment 3
C.1 Worker and Team Leader Instructions
Workers received instructions pertaining to their job. Team leaders received
copies of the worker instructions. In addition, they received their own in-
structions with details about the experiment and rules for communicating
with workers. In the following, team leader instructions are merged into
worker instructions. Information accessible only to team leaders is marked
by [TL]. Parts that are irrelevant for the experiment are omitted. A com-
plete German version of the handbook can be obtained from the author upon
request.
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Front page [omitted] 
1. The company [omitted] 
2. The campaign [omitted] 
3. Company products [omitted] 
4. Promotion Procedure 
Both hotspot and club shifts have a duration of 3 hours. There is no prolongation or abortion 
ahead of time. Hotspot shifts are from 5pm to 8pm and club shifts from 11pm to2am. 
Each team leader (TL) takes care of two teams, each team consisting of two workers. The TL is 
the contact person for questions of any kind. 
Preparation [TL]
A few days prior to the first shift, the TLs receive the  schedules, material and clothing for all 
shifts. 
List of material and clothing [omitted]:
Registration:  TLs will enter the data collected during the promotion into our online database. 
For this purpose it is necessary that every TL registers on [web address omitted] and 
communicates his/her user name to our office for the TL account to be activated. 
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Division into wage groups [TL]
The University of Zürich is conducting a scientific study in the context of the promotion 
campaign.  
Each team consists of a “worker 1” and a “worker 2”. This classification is irrelevant for the 
function of the workers, it is identical for both! The classification has, however, an effect on the 
workers’ wages. 
During the first week (i.e., FRI and SAT in week 1) ALL workers (i.e., both “worker 1” and 
“worker 2”) earn 12 € instead of the declared 10 € per hour. 
In the second week (i.e. FRI and SAT in week 2), teams are divided into 3 different groups. 
Group HH: Both, “worker 1” and “worker 2” continue to earn 12 € per hour (HH = 
“worker 1” High, “worker 2” High) 
Group LL: Both, “worker 1” and “worker 2” NOW receive 9 € per hour (LL = 
“worker 1” Low, “worker 2” Low) 
Group HL: ONLY “worker 2” receives NOW 9 € per hour, “worker 1” CONTINUES 
to receive 12 € per hour (HL = “worker 1” High, “worker 2” Low) 
HH Week 1 (FRI / SAT)  Week 2 (FRI / SAT) 
“worker 1”: 12 €/hour 12 €/hour 
“worker 2”: 12 €/hour 12 €/hour 
   
LL Week 1 (FRI / SAT)  Week 2 (FRI / SAT) 
“worker 1”: 12 €/hour 9 €/hour 
“worker 2”: 12 €/hour 9 €/hour 
   
H_T Week 1 (FRI / SAT)  Week 2 (FRI / SAT) 
“worker 1”: 12 €/hour 12 €/hour 
“worker 2”: 12 €/hour 9 €/hour 
In all TL documents, groups are marked with HH, LL and HL. Group classification of the teams 
is mentioned on the schedule.  
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Meeting at the beginning of the shift [TL]
The TL arranges the team’s meeting point. The meetings with the different teams are spaced 15 
minutes apart. (i.e., different teams do not meet!). 
BEFORE EACH SHIFT: The TL prepares all material necessary for the shift. The TL distributes 
the material to the workers at the beginning of the shift and collects it again after the shift. The 
TL is responsible for the preparation of the preparation of the documents, in particular the worker 
protocol and the TL protocol (correct date, location, worker names, wage group). The TL takes 
this information from the schedule. 
Club shifts: before the first shift, the TL distributes T-shirts which the workers keep until the end 
of the last shift. 
To ensure that shifts start in time, the TL arranges meetings 20 to 30 minutes before the 
beginning of the shift. Potential specifics for the shift can be discussed during this meeting. 
Announcement of changes in wages [TL]
Week 1:
ALL groups,  wage increase
“All workers receive 12 € instead of 10 € per hour. The manager has decided this.” 
Week 2:
Group HH,   equal wage 
“All workers continue to receive 12 € per hour. The manager has decided this.” 
Group LL,   wage cut for both 
“From now on, all workers receive 9 € instead 12 € per hour. The manager has decided this.” 
Group HL,   wage cut for “worker 2” 
“From now on, all “workers 2”receive 9 € instead of 12 € per hour. The manager has decided 
this.” 
IMPORTANT: There are strict rules for the communication with the workers (including how to 
react to questions). See communication guideline below. 
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During the shift [TL]
The TL 
1. is the first to be at the meeting point and prepares handover of material 
2. defines the radius of action for each promoter 
3. takes care that workers are spaced far apart 
4. takes pictures of customers when possible 
5. appears periodically at the points-of-sale 
6. takes care of supplies for workers 
7. takes care that points-of-sale are clean (no dumped flyers or tickets) 
8. takes care of the time limit of the shift 
End of the shift [TL]
The TL collects material, documents and cash from workers. The TL records the sold tickets. TL 
and workers fill in the worker protocol. Then, workers are allowed to leave. 
AFTER THE WORKERS HAVE LEFT, the TL fills in the TL protocol. 
Post-processing [TL]
After each shift, the TL enters collected data into the online database. TLs receive a briefing for 
this task. The worker protocols, TL protocols and lists are handed in at the company’s central 
office after the last shift. Cash can be handed over earlier on receipt to the responsible managers. 
The same procedure is used in both the December and the January campaign. 
5. Summary promotion task 
With short and concise customer approaches, a sales talk is completed after 3 minutes, after 
completion of the customer information form. However, we calculate on an average of 4 to 5 
minutes, resulting in 10 to 20 tickets per hour. 
A shift lasts 3 hours. We target popular public places and clubs in order to find more potential 
customers than can be approached. 
The task of each worker is to approach each person in the age range of 18 to 30 years and to 
inform him/her as concisely and targeted as possible about the promotional ticket, resulting in: 
A set of two tickets 
x sold for 5 € or 
x registration via customer registration form 
When the registration form has been filled in, it is collected by the worker, and the customer 
receives a flyer. 
During the shift, the tickets are carefully stored and handed back to the TL after the shift. Then, 
the revenue is registered and given to the TL.
6. Handling of clothing and material [omitted]
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7. DOs and DON‘Ts [worker] 
DOs
9 Scheduled shifts are mandatory 
9 Appear on time at the meeting point 
9 In case of sudden indisposition, inform TL at least 6 hours before the shift 
9 Enthusiasm for the campaign and pleasure with the job 
9 Be cheerful and convincing 
9 Concise approaches 
9 Ensure readability and correctness of information. For this purpose, fill in the form for the 
customer and require an ID (tickes only for correct information, otherwise for 5 €) 
9 Careful handling of provided material 
9 Record worker initials on each customer form 
9 Arrange ride back independently. The TL is not responsible  for that. 
DON'Ts
9 Cancel shifts on short notice 
9 Not being punctual 
9 Being in a bad mood and creating bad mood within the team 
9 Drinking alcohol during the shift 
9 Long cigarette breaks (5 minutes per hour max.) 
Contact person
During the shift, your contact person is the TL responsible that for you. The TL also supplies you 
with all information pertaining to your job. For further inquiries, please contact the company’s 
regional office at [address omitted]. 
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8. Communication guideline [TL] 
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES mention to workers: 
9 Study of University of Zürich 
9 Existence of other wage groups 
9 To workers of the December campaign: Existence of the January campaign 
9 Subsequent verification of collected customer information 
Emphasize in the presence of workers: 
9 Campaign is one-time, no further job opportunity 
9 Division in “worker 1” and “worker 2” was random and is irrelevant for the job 
9 The goal of 10-20 tickets per hour is non-binding and has no consequence for earnings 
If workers ask: 
9 “Why are there a worker 1 and a worker 2?”
Answer: This was introduced for accounting purposes. 
9  “Why does the wage change?”
Answer: I don’t know, this is what the manager said. 
9 “I have come to know that there are other wage groups.”
Answer: I have no knowledge of that, I will enquire about this. 
9 Other questions/remarks:
Answer: That’s the way it is, it’s what the manager said. 
9. Behavior guideline [TL] 
9 Treat all workers in the same way, no differential motivation or punishment.
9 No active performance monitoring. The workers must not feel watched or controlled (e.g., 
when the TL comes to the point-of-sale and takes customer pictures).
10. Figures at a glance [omitted] 
Please effectuate the instructions of this handbook, so that all goals can be attained and 
everything can be properly accounted for.
Thank you very much 
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C.2 A Model of Social Comparison
The standard economic model ignores fairness motives and social comparison
because it assumes that individuals exclusively pursue their own material
interest. Consequently, in the absence of reputation incentives, neither the
level of the own flat wage nor the level of coworker wages has an impact on
effort because in each case material work incentives are identical.
The model of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
however, takes fairness and social comparison into account and provides a
micro-foundation of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. In particular, the level of
the flat wage determines firm and worker payoffs and thus influences inequity
between the involved parties. An inequity averse worker therefore has an
incentive to minimize this inequity by choosing a specific level of effort.
In our setup a firm employs two identical workers, worker 1 and worker
2. We analyze worker i’s effort ei in response to the wages wi and wj set by
the firm, and to coworker effort ej. Let the firm’s payoff from worker i be
the revenue generated by worker i minus wage cost:
pii = vei − wi, i ∈ {1, 2}, ei, wi ≥ 0.
Let worker i’s payoff be her wage minus her effort cost:
xi = wi − cei, 0 < c < v,
and let worker i’s utility be the sum of her payoff xi, her disutility from
inequity with respect to the firm, and her disutility from inequity with respect
to her coworker j:
Ui = xi −
α
2
max{pii − xi, 0} −
β
2
max{xi − pii, 0}
−
α
2
max{xj − xi, 0} −
β
2
max{xi − xj, 0}
with the assumption that β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1. The parameter α measures
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how much the worker dislikes disadvantageous inequity and β measures how
much she dislikes advantageous inequity.1
Inequity
Effort is not contractible, thus the only reason why a worker should exert
effort is to reduce inequity. Consider first inequity between one worker and
the firm:
|xi − pii| = |2wi − (c+ v)ei|.
If the worker does not provide effort, i.e., ei = 0, she creates inequity to her
advantage of xi − pii = 2wi. If she works, she will reduce her own payoff
but at the same time increase the firm’s payoff. One unit of effort decreases
inequity with respect to the firm by c + v units. For any wage wi, the level
of effort that equalizes worker and firm payoff is:
exi=piii (wi) =
2
c+ v
wi ≡ e
F (wi).
Consider now inequity between worker and coworker. Inequity in relation to
the coworker depends on the wages and effort levels of both workers:
|xi − xj| = |wi − wj − c(ei − ej)|.
Hence, in contrast to worker-firm inequity, one unit of effort changes inequity
in relation to the coworker by only c units because own effort does not affect
coworker payoff. For wage levels wi and wj, and coworker effort ej, the level
of own effort that equalizes worker and coworker payoff is:
e
xi=xj
i (wi, wj, ej) = ej +
wi − wj
c
≡ eC .
In the special case of equal wages (wi = wj), worker payoffs are equalized if
and only if they exert the same amount of effort.
1When α, β = 0, the worker only cares about her own payoff, which corresponds to the
standard economic model.
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Effort Choice
We now analyze a worker’s effort choice for different values of α and β.
First, if a worker does not suffer enough from advantageous inequity (i.e., for
β below a threshold β), she will never exert effort. In other words, marginal
utility from inequity reduction with respect to both firm and coworker is
lower than marginal cost of effort:
β
2
(c+ v) +
β
2
< c, xi ≥ pii.
This is equivalent to a low value of β:
β <
2c
2c+ v
≡ β.
Second, if a worker suffers much from advantageous inequity with respect
to the firm, and not too much from disadvantageous inequity with respect
to her coworker, she will always exert effort, no matter how much effort her
coworker exerts:
β
2
(c+ v)−
α
2
c > c, xi ≥ pii.
This corresponds to a low value of α and high value of β:
α < β
c+ c
v
− 2 ≡ α¯
Hence, a worker with such inequity parameters will increase effort as long as
her payoff is greater than firm payoff. However, no worker ever exerts more
effort than the level that equalizes worker and firm payoff, i.e., ei = e
F , even if
thereby she could reduce advantageous inequity with respect to her coworker.
This is because marginal cost from increased disadvantageous inequity with
respect to the firm always outweighs marginal gain from inequity reduction
with respect to the coworker:
−
α
2
(c+ v) +
β
2
c < 0.
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As a result, a worker with a low α and high β will always equalize payoffs
with the firm by exerting eF .
Third, if a worker suffers much from both advantageous inequity with re-
spect to the firm and disadvantageous inequity with respect to her coworker,
she would like to decrease inequity with respect to the firm because β > β,
but she is not willing to incur a lower payoff than her coworker because
α > α¯. Thus, if both α and β are high, she will always equalize payoffs with
her coworker rather than with the firm by choosing effort level eC .
Now we can characterize the three sets of Nash equilibrium strategies for
worker 1 and worker 2 as a function of α and β:
(i) β < β : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0
(ii) β ≥ β, α < α¯ : e∗1 = e
F (wi), e
∗
2 = e
F (wj)
(iii) β ≥ β, α ≥ α¯ : e∗1 = e1, e
∗
2 = e1 +
w2 − w1
c
, e1 ∈ [0, e
F
1 ], e2 ∈ [0, e
F
2 ]
Effort Choice Predictions across Treatments
Now suppose that the wage can take on two levels, H and L, with H − L =
∆ > 0. Consider the situation where both workers earn the high wage H. In
case (i), workers provide zero effort in equilibrium. In case (ii), they provide
positive effort eF (H) = 2
c+v
H. In case (iii), any effort level between 0 and
eF (H) that is chosen by both workers is a Nash equilibrium. However, if
we assume that workers are able to coordinate on the coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium, only two equilibria remain. These two equilibria again depend
on the value of β. If β is below a threshold β¯, workers care little about
advantageous inequity with respect to the firm and coordinate on a effort
level of 0. Conversely, if β is above β¯, workers care much about inequity
with respect to the firm and coordinate on eF (H):
(iii.a) α ≥ α¯, β ≤ β <
2c
c+ v
≡ β¯ : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0
(iii.b) α ≥ α¯, β ≥ β¯ : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = e
F (H)
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Figure C.1: Equilibrium effort levels in the four treatment groups
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Figure C.1a shows the equilibrium effort levels if both workers earn the
high wage.
The situation where both workers earn the low wage L is analogous to
the situation above (see Figure C.1b). Thus, depending on the values of the
inequity parameters, workers choose either e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0 or e
∗
1 = e
∗
2 = e
F (L).
In the latter case, a lower wage implies a lower effort level, i.e., eF (L) =
eF (H) − 2∆
c+v
< eF (H) because the firm-equalizing effort level eF = 2
c+v
w is
proportional to the wage.
Now consider the situation where worker 1 earns the high wage H and
worker 2 the low wage L (see Figures C.1c and C.1d). In case (i), where
workers do not suffer much from inequity, equilibrium effort is 0 for both
workers. In case (ii), where workers equalize their respective payoffs with the
firm, equilibrium effort is eF (H) for worker 1, and eF (L) for worker 2. In case
(iii), workers equalize payoffs with each other. In case (iii.a), worker 1 has
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Figure C.2: Payoffs as functions of effort.
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to choose a positive effort because worker 2 cannot provide negative effort.
Worker 1 therefore chooses effort e˜1 =
∆
c
unless this value exceeds eF (H), in
which case she chooses eF (H). In case (iii.b), worker 1 chooses eF (H). She is
not willing to provide more effort than eF (H) because the utility gain from
inequity reduction with respect to the coworker would always be lower than
the associated effort cost. Thus, in order to equalize worker payoffs, worker
2 chooses e˜2 = e
F (H) − ∆
c
unless this value is negative, in which case she
chooses 0.
Effort e˜2 is lower than e
F (L) because worker 2 can influence the payoff of
the firm but not the payoff of her coworker. As can be seen in Figure C.2,
to eliminate 2∆ units of inequity with respect to the firm, worker 2 has to
reduce effort from eF (H) to eF (L). This reduction amounts to 2∆
c+v
units
because reducing effort by one unit not only increases own payoff by c units
but also reduces firm payoff by v units. In contrast, to eliminate ∆ units
of inequity with respect to the coworker, worker 2 has to reduce effort by ∆
c
units because reducing effort by one unit increases own payoff by c but leaves
coworker payoff unaffected. Because marginal product of effort v is greater
than marginal cost of effort c, e˜2 is lower than e
F (L).
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Summary of Hypotheses
We now derive the hypotheses for the change in effort from pre- to post-
intervention period across treatments:2
Hypothesis 1 (Treatment LL)
1a If β < β or β < β¯, α ≥ α¯: both workers’ equilibrium effort levels remain
the same.
1b Otherwise: both workers’ equilibrium effort levels decrease.
Hypothesis 2 (Treatment Group HL2)
2a If β < β or β < β¯, α ≥ α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level remains the
same.
2b Otherwise: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level decreases.
2b’ If β ≥ β, α < α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level is the same as
in LL.
2b” If β ≥ β, α ≥ α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level is lower as in
LL.
Hypothesis 3 (Treatment Group HL1)
3a If α < α¯ or β < β or β ≥ β¯, α ≥ α¯: worker 1’s equilibrium effort level
remains the same.
3b Otherwise: worker 1’s equilibrium effort level increases.
2Treatment HH equilibrium effort levels are the same as pre-intervention period equi-
librium effort levels because both workers continue to earn the high wage.
133
Bibliography
Abler, B., H. Walter, A. Wunderlich, J. Grothe, C. Schönfeldt-Lecuona,
M. Spitzer, and U. Herwig (2005). Side effects of transcranial magnetic
stimulation biased task performance in a cognitive neuroscience study.
Brain topography 17 (4), 193–196.
Adams, J. (1963). Toward an Understanding of Inequity. Journal of Abnor-
mal and Social Psychology 67 (5), 422–436.
Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen (1990). The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unem-
ployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2), 255–283.
Allen, T. (2010, January 29). Euro area unemployment rate up to 10.0%.
News Release 16/2010, Eurostat, Luxembourg.
Andreoni, J. and J. Miller (1993). Rational Cooperation in the Finitely
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. The Economic
Journal 103 (418), 570–585.
Aron, A., T. Robbins, and R. Poldrack (2004). Inhibition and the right
inferior frontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4), 170–177.
Bardsley, N. (2008). Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact? Experimen-
tal Economics 11 (2), 122–133.
Basu, S., J. Dickhaut, G. Hecht, K. Towry, and G. Waymire (2009). Record-
keeping alters economic history by promoting reciprocity. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 106 (4), 1009–1014.
134
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bateson, M., D. Nettle, and G. Roberts (2006). Cues of being watched
enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters 12, 412–414.
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social
history. Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1), 122–142.
Bernheim, B. and A. Rangel (2007). Behavioral public economics: Welfare
and policy analysis with non-standard decision-makers. In P. Diamond
and H. Vartiainen (Eds.), Behavioral Economics and its Applications, pp.
7–77. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004). How Much Should
We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119 (1), 249–275.
Bewley, T. (1999). Why wages don’t fall in a recession. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity,
and competition. American Economic Review 90 (1), 166–193.
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooper-
ation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology 65 (1),
17–28.
Boyd, R., H. Gintis, S. Bowles, and P. Richerson (2003). The evolution
of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences 100 (6), 3531–3535.
Boyd, R. and P. Richerson (2005). The origin and evolution of cultures. New
York City, NY: Oxford University Press, USA.
Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr (2004). Relational contracts and the nature
of market interactions. Econometrica 72 (3), 747–780.
Burnham, T. and B. Hare (2007). Engineering Human Cooperation. Human
Nature 18 (2), 88–108.
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Camerer, C. and U. Malmendier (2005). Behavioral economics of organiza-
tions. In P. Diamond and H. Vartiainen (Eds.), Behavioral Economics and
its Applications, pp. 235–281. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. and K. Weigelt (1988). Experimental tests of a sequential equi-
librium reputation model. Econometrica 56 (1), 1–36.
Card, D. (1997). Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline Industry.
In J. Peoples (Ed.), Regulatory reform and labor markets, pp. 183–230.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Carver, C. and T. White (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activa-
tion, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: The
BIS/BAS scales. Journal of personality and social psychology 67, 319–333.
Charness, G. and P. Kuhn (2007). Does pay inequality affect worker effort?
Experimental evidence. Journal of Labor Economics 25 (4), 693–723.
Christie, R. and F. C. Geis (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. New York:
Academic Press.
Cochard, F., P. Nguyen Van, and M. Willinger (2004). Trusting behavior in
a repeated investment game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-
zation 55 (1), 31–44.
Cohn, A., E. Fehr, and L. Goette (2009). Fair Wage and Effort - Evidence
from a Field Experiment. Unpublished manuscript.
Cooper, D. and J. Kagel (2010). Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective
Survey of Experimental Results. In J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth (Eds.), The
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
136
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Croson, R. (2007). Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evi-
dence from linear public goods games. Economic Inquiry 45 (2), 199–216.
Davis, J. (1959). A formal interpretation of the theory of relative deprivation.
Sociometry 22 (4), 280–296.
Dawes, C., J. Fowler, T. Johnson, R. McElreath, and O. Smirnov (2007).
Egalitarian motives in humans. Nature 446, 794–796.
Delgado, M., R. Frank, and E. Phelps (2005). Perceptions of moral character
modulate the neural systems of reward during the trust game. Nature
Neuroscience 8 (11), 1611–1618.
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004). A theory of sequential reci-
procity. Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2), 268–298.
Eisenegger, C., V. Treyer, E. Fehr, and D. Knoch (2008). Time-course of
“off-line” prefrontal rTMS effects—a PET study. NeuroImage 42 (1), 379–
384.
Engelmann, D. and U. Fischbacher (2009). Indirect reciprocity and strategic
reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 67 (2), 399–407.
Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and
Economic Behavior 54 (2), 293–315.
Falk, A., S. Gächter, and J. Kovács (1999). Intrinsic motivation and extrin-
sic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts. Journal of
Economic Psychology 20 (3), 251–284.
Falk, A. and J. Heckman (2009). Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of
Knowledge in the Social Sciences. Science 326 (5952), 535–538.
Fehr, E. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3), 159–181.
137
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fehr, E., M. Brown, and C. Zehnder (2009). On Reputation: A Micro-
foundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity. The Economic
Journal 119 (536), 333–353.
Fehr, E. and A. Falk (1999). Wage rigidity in a competitive incomplete
contract market. Journal of Political Economy 107 (1), 106–134.
Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2003). The nature of human altruism. Na-
ture 425 (6960), 785–791.
Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher, and S. Gächter (2002). Strong reciprocity, human
cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13 (1),
1–25.
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. American Economic Review 90 (4), 980–994.
Fehr, E. and L. Götte (2007). Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High?
Evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Economic Re-
view 97 (1), 298–317.
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868.
Fehr, E. and F. Schneider (2009). Eyes are on us, but nobody cares: are eye
cues relevant for strong reciprocity? Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, –. published online ahead of print.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human rela-
tions 7 (2), 117–140.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic
Experiments. Experimental Economics 10 (2), 171–178.
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter, and E. Fehr (2001). Are people conditionally
cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Let-
ters 71 (3), 397–404.
138
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Friedman, D. (1995). The machinery of freedom: guide to a radical capital-
ism. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing.
Gächter, S., D. Nosenzo, and M. Sefton (2008, August). The impact of social
comparisons on reciprocity. Working paper, IZA.
Gächter, S. and A. Falk (2002). Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences
for the Labour Relation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104 (1), 1–27.
Gächter, S. and E. Fehr (1999). Collective action as a social exchange. Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39 (4), 341–369.
Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theo-
retical Biology 206 (2), 169–179.
Gintis, H., S. Bowles, R. Boyd, and E. Fehr (2003). Explaining altruistic
behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 24 (3), 153–172.
Greenberg, J. (1990). Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity:
The hidden cost of pay cuts. Journal of Applied Psychology 75 (5), 561–568.
Greiner, B. (2004). The Online Recruitment System ORSEE: A Guide for the
Organization of Experiments in Economics. In K. Kremer and V. Macho
(Eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, Göttingen. Ges.
für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung. GWDG Bericht 63.
Griškova, I., O. Rukše˙nas, K. Dapšys, S. Herpertz, and J. Höppner (2007).
The effects of 10 Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation on resting
EEG power spectrum in healthy subjects. Neuroscience Letters 419 (2),
162–167.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2007). Welfare without happiness. American
Economic Review 97 (2), 471–476.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2008). The case for mindless economics. In
A. Caplin and A. Schotter (Eds.), The foundations of Positive and nor-
139
BIBLIOGRAPHY
mative Economics: A handbook, pp. 3–42. New York City, NY: Oxford
University Press, USA.
Hagen, E. and P. Hammerstein (2006). Game theory and human evolution: A
critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games. Theoretical
Population Biology 69 (3), 339–348.
Haley, K. and D. Fessler (2005). Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect
generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Be-
havior 26 (3), 245–56.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., B. Rockenbach, and A. Sadrieh (forthcoming). In Search
of Workers’ Real Effort Reciprocity – A Field and a Laboratory Experi-
ment. Journal of the European Economic Association.
Henrich, J. and R. Boyd (2001). Why People Punish Defectors: Weak Con-
formist Transmission can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Coop-
erative Dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 208 (1), 79–89.
Homans, G. (1961). Social behaviour: Its elementary forms. London, UK:
Taylor & Francis.
Houser, D., J. Wooders, and M. Hall (2006). Reputation in auctions: Theory,
and evidence from eBay. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 15,
353–369.
Howitt, P. (2002). Looking inside the labor market: a review article. Journal
of Economic Literature 40 (1), 125–138.
Izuma, K., D. Saito, and N. Sadato (2008). Processing of social and monetary
rewards in the human striatum. Neuron 58 (2), 284–294.
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler (1986). Fairness as a constraint
on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Re-
view 76 (4), 728–741.
140
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Keser, C. and F. Van Winden (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary
contributions to public goods. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (1),
23–39.
King-Casas, B., D. Tomlin, C. Anen, C. Camerer, S. Quartz, and P. Mon-
tague (2005). Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person
economic exchange. Science 308 (5718), 78–83.
Knoch, D., A. Pascual-Leone, K. Meyer, V. Treyer, and E. Fehr (2006).
Diminishing reciprocal fairness by disrupting the right prefrontal cortex.
Science 314 (5800), 829–832.
Knoch, D., F. Schneider, D. Schunk, M. Hohmann, and E. Fehr (2009).
Disrupting the prefrontal cortex diminishes the human ability to build a
good reputation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (49),
20895–20899.
Koch, G., M. Oliveri, S. Torriero, G. Carlesimo, P. Turriziani, and C. Calta-
girone (2005). rTMS evidence of different delay and decision processes in a
fronto-parietal neuronal network activated during spatial working memory.
Neuroimage 24 (1), 34–39.
Kochan, T. and T. Barocci (1985). Human resource management and in-
dustrial relations: text, readings, and cases. New York City, NY: Little,
Brown.
Kocher, M., T. Cherry, S. Kroll, R. Netzer, and M. Sutter (2008). Conditional
cooperation on three continents. Economics Letters 101 (3), 175–178.
Kole, S. and K. Lehn (2000). Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of
Value in Mergers. The Case of USAir’s Acquisition of Piedmont Aviation.
In S. N. Kaplan (Ed.), Mergers and productivity, pp. 239–279. University
of Chicago Press.
141
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982). Rational coop-
eration in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic
Theory 27, 245–252.
Kube, S., M. A. Maréchal, and C. Puppe (2008, July). The Currency of
Reciprocity – Gift-Exchange in the Workplace. Working Paper 377, IEW.
Kube, S., M. A. Maréchal, and C. Puppe (2010, January). Do Wage Cuts
damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Work-
ing Paper 471, IEW.
Kurzban, R., P. DeScioli, and E. O’Brien (2007). Audience effects on moral-
istic punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior 28 (2), 75–84.
Kurzban, R. and D. Houser (2005). Experiments investigating cooperative
types in humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and simulations.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102 (5), 1803–1807.
Landsburg, S. (2007). The Methodology of Normative Economics. Journal
of Public Economic Theory 9 (5), 757–769.
Lawler, E. (1990). Strategic pay: Aligning organizational strategies and pay
systems. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Lee, D. and N. Rupp (2007). Retracting a gift: How does employee effort
respond to wage reductions? Journal of Labor Economics 25 (4), 725–761.
Levine, D. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review
of Economic Dynamics 1 (3), 593–622.
Levitt, S. and J. List (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring
social preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 21 (2), 153–174.
Loewenstein, G. and E. Haisley (2008). The economist as therapist: method-
ological ramifications of ‘light’ paternalism. In A. Caplin and A. Schotter
142
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Eds.), The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Hand-
book, pp. 210–245. New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, USA.
Mas, A. and E. Moretti (2009). Peers at work. American Economic Re-
view 99 (1), 112–145.
Milinski, M., D. Semmann, T. Bakker, and H. Krambeck (2001). Cooperation
through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy? Proceed-
ings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 268 (1484), 2495–2501.
Milinski, M., D. Semmann, and H. Krambeck (2002). Reputation helps solve
the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature 415 (6870), 424–426.
Miller, E. K. and J. D. Cohen (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal
cortex function. Annual Review of Neuroscience 24, 167–202.
Nowak, M. A. and K. Sigmund (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by
image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577.
Nowak, M. A. and K. Sigmund (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity.
Nature 437 (7063), 1291–1298.
Panchanathan, K. and R. Boyd (2004). Indirect reciprocity can stabilize co-
operation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432 (7016),
499–502.
Perugini, M., M. Gallucci, F. Presaghi, and A. Ercolani (2003). The personal
norm of reciprocity. European Journal of Personality 17 (4), 251–283.
Plassmann, H., J. O’Doherty, and A. Rangel (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex
encodes willingness to pay in everyday economic transactions. Journal of
Neuroscience 27 (37), 9984–9988.
Pollis, N. (1968). Reference group re-examined. The British Journal of
Sociology 19 (3), 300–307.
143
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics.
American Economic Review 83 (5), 1281–1302.
Rege, M. and K. Telle (2004). The Impact of Social Approval and Framing.
Journal of Public Economics 88 (7–8), 1625–1644.
Rigdon, M., K. Ishii, M. Watabe, and S. Kitayama (2009). Minimal social
cues in the dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology 30, 358–367.
Robertson, E. M., H. Théoret, and A. Pascual-Leone (2003). Studies in cog-
nition: The problems solved and created by transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (7), 948–960.
Rockenbach, B. and M. Milinski (2006). The efficient interaction of indirect
reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444 (7120), 718–723.
Runciman, W. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of
attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Sack, A. and D. Linden (2003). Combining transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion and functional imaging in cognitive brain research: possibilities and
limitations. Brain Research Reviews 43 (1), 41–56.
Salpukas, A. (1987, July 21). The 2-tier wage system is found to be 2-edged
sword by industry. The New York Times, pp. 1 and 47.
Seinen, I. and A. Schram (2006). Social status and group norms: Indirect
reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. European Economic Re-
view 50 (3), 581–602.
Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker
discipline device. American Economic Review 74 (3), 433–444.
Shearer, B. (2003). Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identi-
fying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments. Journal of the European
Economic Association 1 (2-3), 503–511.
144
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Shearer, B. (2004). Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence from a
field experiment. Review of Economic Studies 71 (2), 513–534.
Simpson, B. and R. Willer (2008). Altruism and indirect reciprocity: The
interaction of person and situation in prosocial behavior. Social Psychology
Quarterly 71 (1), 37–52.
Smith, A. (2010). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London, UK: Penguin
Classics.
Smith, F., L. Debruine, B. Jones, D. Krupp, L. Welling, and C. Conway
(2009). Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behav-
ior in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior 30 (6), 393–397.
Spitzer, M., U. Fischbacher, B. Herrnberger, G. Grön, and E. Fehr (2007).
The neural signature of social norm compliance. Neuron 56 (1), 185–196.
Strobel, A., A. Beauducel, S. Debener, and B. Brocke (2001). Eine
deutschsprachige Version des BIS/BAS-Fragebogens von Carver und
White. Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie 22 (3),
216–227.
Takahashi, H., M. Kato, M. Matsuura, M. Koeda, N. Yahata, T. Suhara, and
Y. Okubo (2008). Neural correlates of human virtue judgment. Cerebral
Cortex 18 (8), 1886–1891.
Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2003). Libertarian paternalism. American Eco-
nomic Review 93 (2), 175–179.
Thöni, C. and S. Gächter (2009, November). Social Comparison and Per-
formance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis.
Working Paper 29, University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics.
Torgler, B., M. Schaffner, B. Frey, S. Schmidt, and U. Dulleck (2008, Octo-
ber). Inequality Aversion and Performance in and on the Field. Working
paper, National Centre for Econometric Research.
145
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Walsh, V. and A. Cowey (2000). Transcranial magnetic stimulation and
cognitive neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 1 (1), 73–80.
Wassermann, E. (1998). Risk and safety of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation: report and suggested guidelines from the International Work-
shop on the Safety of Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, June
5–7, 1996. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology/Evoked
Potentials Section 108 (1), 1–16.
Wedekind, C. and M. Milinski (2000). Cooperation through image scoring
in humans. Science 288 (5467), 850–852.
Wout, M., R. Kahn, A. Sanfey, and A. Aleman (2005). Repetitive tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
affects strategic decision-making. Neuroreport 16 (16), 1849–1852.
146
Curriculum Vitae
Frédéric-Guillaume Schneider
Date of birth October 12, 1981
Place of birth Werne, Germany
Nationality German, French
Education
Jan 2006 – present University of Zürich, Switzerland
Doctoral studies in Economics
Jan 2008 – Jan 2009 Foundation of the Swiss National Bank
Gerzensee, Switzerland
Swiss Program for Beginning Doctoral
Students in Economics
Apr 2002 – Aug 2005 University of Bonn, Germany
Diplom-Volkswirt (graduate degree in
economics)
Professional Experience
Jan 2006 – present Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, University of Zürich
research associate
Oct 2005 – Dec 2005 Centre for European Economic Research,
Mannheim, Germany
research internship
Oct 2003 – Mar 2004 University of Bonn, Germany
teaching assistant in macroeconomics
147
